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The University of Nebraska ... has just issued the first number of 
the Mid-West Quarterl)', a magazine interesting in itself and even 
more interesting as a sign of the times .... the articles might be 
called academic by those who have become accustomed even to 
the better of our commercial magazines, but they are addressed 
... to the smaller public, and they are academic in the good sense 
of the word-thoughtful discussions of the deeper problems of 
the day as seen from the angle where literature and education 
and life meet and cross one another. This Quarterly will be taken 
by some as a confirmation of the common opinion that the brains 
of the country are draining from our Eastern to our Western 
institutions. But that is another, and very tangled, story. 
Nation, 20 November 1913 
PAUL ELMER MORE, the editor of the Nation, had several motives 
for celebrating the birth of the Mid-West Quarterly. He was a close 
friend of its editor, Prosser Hall Frye, and he believed it would 
contribute signally to a movement of which he and Irving Babbitt, 
more than a decade before, had been the pioneers: the new, or 
neo-, humanism. More himself was just completing a two-year stint 
as editor of the Nation, and under his guidance it had become not 
only the most intelligent conservative journal in America, but also, 
in the opinion of many, the best literary review in the English 
language. More would be resigning its editorship, however, by the 
time the second issue of the Quarterly appeared in January 1914, 
and the Nation would feel his loss. In 1914, too, was founded the 
New Republic, another, but very different, "sign of the times." 
Frye had come to know More through his brother, Louis Tren-
chard More, then teaching, like Frye, at the University of Ne-
braska, and Frye had been on intimate terms with Paul since 1899, 
when he and his new wife visited the More brothers at Paul's retreat 
in Shelburne, New Hampshire. They corresponded frequently and 
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at length until Frye's death in 1934. 1 A glance at his essays or the 
Frye-More letters will show Frye's loyal but lively allegiance to neo-
humanism. His dedicating to More his most famous book, Romance 
and Tragedy (1922), elicited one of More's best-known remarks: "I 
am obliged to say that the dedication may work you a mischief. I 
have gained the rather sad preeminence of being at once the least 
read and the worst hated author in the country."2 A year earlier, 
when Frye had sought his permission for the dedication, More 
observed that "our only hope of accomplishing anything at all is to 
give the impression that there is a considerable group of us hang-
ing together." He describes the neohumanists as an embattled 
group (H. L. Mencken had recently fulminated against them) and 
welcomes into "the circle of the damned" Frye's colleague, S. B. 
Gass, the second most important contributor to the Quarterly.3 It is 
not strange, then, that the new humanism should find ample space 
on the pages of Frye's journal. 
But Frye was a pioneering scholar and critic in his own right. 
One of his most illustrious colleagues, H. B. Alexander, described 
him as "the dean of the group of critical and belles-Iettrist authors 
which the University of Nebraska has produced." Many years later 
he is still recalled as one of the leaders of a "vital literary move-
ment." And the highly respected first editor of the Prairie Schooner, 
Lowry Wimberly, considered him "the most intellectual man he 
had known."4 Under his direction, the Quarterly became for a few 
years one of the most articulate organs of the new humanism. Both 
S. B. Gass and P. M. Buck, good friends of Frye and prolific writers 
for the journal, were some dozen years his juniors and were clearly 
influenced by his thought. Other contributors, whether Nebras-
kans like Louise Pound and Langworthy Taylor, or outsiders like 
Robert Shafer and Hardin Craig, also reflect the values of neo-
humanism. There are of course a great variety of articles and view-
points, and Frye was no tyrannical editor, but the only significant 
contributor who is not patently a neohumanist is H. B. Alexander. 
The Quarterly was published by G. P. Putnam's, the same conserva-
tive house that had been issuing More's Shelburne Essays, and the 
Quarterly, like the Essays, was an important medium for the early 
expression of neohumanism. 
It is no part of my purpose to undertake a history of the new 
humanism. That has already been adequately done, and several 
good articles and books have appeared on its chief advocates, Bab-
bitt and More. 5 Moreover, in the course of analyzing Frye's Quar-
terly essays, it will be possible to identify many of the central posi-
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tions of neohumanism. Nevertheless, some preliminary definitions 
may be useful. 
The Quarterly ran from 1913 to 1918. The intellectual currents in 
these years have been examined very carefully by Henry F. May in 
The End of American Innocence: A Study of the First Years of Our Own 
Time, 1912-1917. May argues that the striking changes in Ameri-
can culture and philosophy found in the twenties can be traced, not 
merely to the Great War, but to the years immediately antecedent. 
Before 1912 Americans subscribed, he says, to three basic articles 
of faith: absolute moral values (moralism), the inevitability of prog-
ress, and, to a lesser degree, culture. Other related ideals were 
democracy, uplift, optimism, reform. The unfair but popular cari-
cature of Woodrow Wilson represents the type. European, par-
ticularly British, culture was admired, and especially the Victorian 
humanist Matthew Arnold, although commentators generally af-
firmed the superiority of America in its political and social dimen-
sions. It was, May says, a time of "sureness and unity, at least on the 
surface," but the intellectual consensus was too facile, and would be 
challenged, well before the war, from several different directions. 
For example, the classical, conservative notion of education as 
transmitter and preserver of culture was doubly attacked: by the 
Deweyites in the interests of pragmatism, and by others on behalf 
of vocationalism. Naturalism in its many forms (Marxism, be-
haviorism, pragmatism, the novels of Zola and Dreiser, the "Ash 
Can" school of painting) undermined conventional notions of man 
as a spiritual and moral being. Moral norms also seemed to be 
assaulted by revivals of romantic aestheticism, Nietzschean egoism, 
critical impressionism. Anglo-Saxon traits were depreciated in 
favor of fashionably "oppressed" races or nationalities: not so much 
the Negro as yet, but chiefly the Italians and the Slavs. The Boas 
school of cultural relativism prevailed among much of the intelli-
gentsia. The intuitionalism of Bergson, and new movements in 
poetry such as imagism and free verse, threatened the ideals of 
order and rationality. Even the motion picture was hailed as rev-
olutionizing education, and Edison proclaimed the obsolescence 
of books in the classroom. Of course conservatives and tradition-
alists, the "defenders of culture" as May terms them, reacted to all 
these assaults, but May urges that their cause had been fatally 
weakened by their own superficiality, and that the Great War only 
accelerated its ultimate collapse. 
May gives surprisingly little space to the new humanism, how-
ever. One reason may be that the movement itself failed to gain 
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momentum till the twenties and thirties, well beyond the compass 
of his study. But it is also true that on the few occasions when May 
mentions Babbitt or More, he has trouble categorizing them. To be 
sure, they are in some ways conservatives; yet they loathed as much 
as any of the rebels the vapidity and optimism of the "defenders of 
culture." He remarks that Babbitt and More were defending, not, 
like the other conservatives, American nineteenth-century culture, 
but "much older forms and beliefs," and this may explain why 
"their conservatism survived the overthrow of the culture of 
1912."6 Writers for the Quarterly oppose most of the new currents 
charted by May: vocational or pragmatic theories of education, the 
many faces of naturalism, irrationality, imagism, and vers libre. The 
motion pictures, just maturing in 1914 with Birth' of a Nation, are 
mentioned only twice, both times briefly and disparagingly (the 
sarcastic title of one article is "Movie Democracy"). Like other con-
servatives, the neohumanists of the Quarterly defend traditional 
morality, admire Arnold and other elements of European culture 
(even British spelling is regularly adhered to), take pride in the 
Anglo-Saxon heritage and character. On the other hand, the Quar-
terly writers do not share with some other conservatives an uncritical 
allegiance to: the inevitability of progress, the self-evident 
superiority of American democratic institutions, the optimism, the 
belief in reform or "moral uplift." Furthermore, most of the major 
articles are sensitive, intelligent expositions, not knee-jerk reactions 
or diatribes. Thus the Quarterly not only is neohumanist in its bent, 
but shares conspicuously in the strengths of that movement. As a 
consequence, many of its articles have retained a freshness and 
even relevance despite the lapse of nearly seventy years. 
Humanism is a term most recalcitrant to definition. Self-
proclaimed humanists are found on all sides of the prewar intel-
lectual picture as May presents it, and the term, unqualified, means 
little more than a disposition to view the arts as an important ex-
pression of man's nature and a central part of his education and 
culture. A humanist can be politically liberal or conservative; he can 
admire or contemn Bergson. or the movies. But neohumanism can 
be defined more rigorously, for as More's remarks quoted earlier 
show, it was a distinctive movement or school, led nationally by 
Babbitt and More, and at the University of Nebraska by Frye. My 
discussion of Frye will, I hope, identify more precisely some of the 
central tenets of neohumanism; and an examination of the other 
contributors will suggest the range of disagreements possible 
within it, for even movements or schools have their dissentient 
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voices. Suffice it for now that the new humanism was opposed to 
most of the modernist tendencies described so accurately by May. 
But it was an attack at once more penetrating and universal than 
most of the other conservative, prewar reactions, and it avoids in 
the main the triteness, the complacency, or the righteous indigna-
tion so often a part of those reactions. The new humanism ema-
nated from the East, and especially from Babbitt's Harvard, where 
three of the six scholars featured in Chapter 1 earned degrees. The 
Quarterly, along with the books of Babbitt and More then appear-
ing, represents an important early phase in the development of 
that movement. It also reflects a significant and hitherto unex-
plored phase in the intellectual life of the University of Nebraska. 
Frye was by disposition a reticent classicist, and he imparted to 
his journal a tone of sober and earnest disquisition. Among its 
pages shall be found no editorials, no profiles of contributors, and 
assuredly nothing so casual and informative as a department of 
letters. No file of correspondence has apparently survived which 
would illuminate the quotidian business of its existence, although it 
is clear that Frye was chiefly responsible for its inception and con-
tinued life. The recollection of S. B. Gass, twenty years later, is of 
interest: 
In 1913 the University undertook the most ambitious adventure in publication of its 
career-The Mid-West Quarterly. The conception was Mr. Frye's, and the execution 
was his. For four years he labored at it writing for it, reading contributions, accept-
ing or rejecting, sometimes virtually rewriting them, editing, proof-reading. And the 
reward was a critical journal of highest character that at once won general acclaim. 
The reward was also a breakdown that sent the editor south for a year's leave of 
absence. The "Quarterly" survived for another year, but proved to be one of the 
casualties of the war.7 
What the records show is this: that P. M. Buck and H. B. Alex-
ander successfully requested Chancellor Avery to submit to the 
board of regents a proposal for a university quarterly which would 
provide a "medium for the literary output of some of our profes-
sors, to extend the influence of the University in academic circles." 
This item was duly placed on the agenda of the board of regents 
for 2 May 1913, and that body tentatively approved the publishing 
of a 112-page quarterly of one thousand copies for the first half-
year, and after that for as many copies as subscriptions required, 
but under no circumstances for fewer than five hundred. The uni-
versity was instructed to appropriate fifteen hundred dollars annu-
ally for two years to cover printing costs, and all earnings of the 
journal were to be turned over to the cash fund of the university.8 
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A committee, established to investigate further, reported back 
favorably, stipulating that "Professor Frye will be in immediate 
charge of the publication."9 This recommendation was made on 17 
June, and the first number, dated October, appeared in early 
November. 10 
The Quarterly was well received. The student newspaper notes, 
on the appearance of the second number, that "many favorable 
and commendable [sic] letters have been received. Favorable com-
ments have also been made in the critical columns of well know[n] 
newspapers and magazines of the country."11 Olivia Pound sup-
ports this assertion a few years later: "The Quarterly has contained 
contributions from writers and scholars of note, and has received 
much commendation from savants in many parts of the United 
States."12 The puff in the Nation was thus not unique or outra-
geously partial. Financing was apparently no problem,13 and wor-
thy submissions were not far to seek. The quality remains high to 
the end, and although Lincolnites occupied the entire first number, 
the Quarterly was soon publishing articles from all over the country. 14 
Frye's health, however, proved to be an insuperable difficulty. 
He requested, and the board of regents approved, a "leave of ab-
sence ... on account of ill health" at the end of 1916. 15 As fre-
quently befalls publications in such circumstances, printing 
schedules lapsed or were abandoned. According to the University 
journal, the January 1918 issue appeared in October of that year, 
and the July 1918 issue is reported as 'just off the press" in October 
1919. 16 P. M. Buck became editor in its last year, but after he se-
cured the deanship of the Arts and Sciences College in 1919, his 
energies were doubtless diverted to more exigent matters. No one 
else, apparently, was eager to take up the task, and of course the 
war interfered. Except for occasional reminiscences by a few con-
tributors, the Quarterly seems to have dropped quickly from the 
remembrance of posterity. 17 
The Quarterly was intended, according to Avery's agenda for the 
regents, to be a medium for the "literary output" of Nebraska 
professors to enhance the academic prestige of the university. 
Frye's own statement of purpose, proclaimed on the back covers of 
the magazine, is loftier in phrase and sentiment: 
The Mid-West Quarterly has been established by the University of Nebraska in the 
belief that there exists in this country a quantity of excellent writing for which there 
is no adequate medium of publication. While exact scholarship, the discovery and 
verification of fact, has received any amount of encouragement and stimulation, the 
cultivation of general ideas, the free play of the intelligence, what Matthew Arnold 
would broadly call criticism, has met of late years with neglect if not with actual 
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disfavor. The results of "scientific" investigation and research. if valuable at all. are 
pretty sure of being taken up by some of the journals devoted to the application of 
special methods to special subjects. For the intellectual essay of a critical character. 
however. there is small opening .... it is the hope of enlarging the opportunities of 
those who are interested in this manifestation of mental activity. irrespective of 
territorial limitations. which has led to the establishment of The Mid-West Quarterly. 
In the agenda description can be detected the pragmatism of an 
administrator, and in Frye's the idealism of a novice editor. But in 
truth Frye's is the more nearly accurate. The Quarterly did become 
more than a regional magazine, though the Nebraska contributors 
set the general tone, and the emphasis in the articles, as Frye 
claims, is on literary, philosophical, pedagogical, and occasionally, 
historical or sociopolitical subjects of scholarly import but general 
appeal. Frye's reference to Arnold suggests its neohumanist bent. 
Aside from its importance in the history of neohumanism, then, 
there are several reasons for being interested in the Quarterly. 
It was, for example, published at the term of the university's 
"golden years" and hence affords insight into the caliber and con-
cerns of the faculty at that time. Is Many controversial issues are 
debated in extenso: the Great War, changing conceptions of the 
liberal arts curricula, modernism in the arts, feminism, socialism, 
and pacifism, the role of historical scholarship and linguistics in 
literary criticism. 
Then too, Frye was an exacting stylist and thinker, and this 
scrupulosity can be discerned in his selection and editing of articles. 
The general excellence of the magazine becomes particularly con-
spicuous when it is compared with a similar publication, Quarterly 
Journal of the University of North Dakota, for the same years. The 
essays there are narrowly conceived, largely parochial and ephem-
eral. For this reason I have spent some time examining the major 
arguments of the most important articles. This is the only way to 
get a sense of what the magazine represented, and the points of 
view propounded are frequently quite germane to our present 
controversies. I have also, usually in the notes, glanced at some 
subsequent expressions or developments of its authors' ideas to 
suggest something of the pioneering role of the Quarterly and its 
connection with later neohumanism. 
I take up in the first chapter the most significant of the Nebraska 
humanists at that time, a group about which little has been written 
collectively or individually. Here I have attempted to assess their 
major contributions to the journal and to adumbrate similarities 
and distinctions among them. To represent more adequately the 
entire range of the magazine, however, I have judged it necessary 
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to include a second chapter, organized around subjects rather than 
authors, where I consider less prolific Nebraska humanists and 
non-Nebraskans. No attempt has been made to discuss every article 
in the magazine. There are some too slight, ephemeral, or repeti-
tive of other essays to merit attention; there are others, good 
enough in themselves, but too specialized to interest even the 
reader of this monograph. Since no index has ever been assembled 
for the Quarterly, I have provided one, and there, of course, the 
entire contents may be surveyed. This index includes the volume 
number and dates of all the articles; hence, the references to arti-
cles in my text will include only page numbers. 
I am indebted to the University of Nebraska Research Council 
for a Fling Summer Fellowship which enabled me to complete this 
study. I must also thank Professor Robert E. Knoll and Professor 
Joseph Svoboda, for their assistance and advice. 
1. The Nebraska Humanists 
SECTION ONE: 
PROSSER HALL FRYE 
A STUDY OF THE Quarterly must begin with Frye. It was clearly his 
conception, and it bears everywhere the impress of his thought. 
Born in New York City in 1866, educated at Trinity College, Con-
necticut, Harvard, and the University of Strasbourg, he came to 
Nebraska in 1896 and by 1910 was head of the Department of 
Rhetoric. He was a pioneer in studies of comparative literature, 
and published incisive essays in such places as the Independent, the 
Bookman, the Nation, and the University of Nebraska Studies. These in 
due course were collected in three books: Literary Reviews and Criti-
cisms (1908), Romance and Tragedy (1922), and Visions and Chimeras 
(1929). A posthumous volume of essays on Plato was published in 
1938. I have elsewhere discussed the entire range of Frye's criti-
cism.! But since he published in the Quarterly several of his most 
representative and substantial essays, an examination of these will 
provide at once a satisfactory introduction to Frye, to the predomi-
nant themes in the Quarterly, and to the neohumanists in general. 
Frye's first essay defines a polarity fundamental to neohumanism, 
romanticism versus classicism; the second essay argues in detail the 
inferiority of romanticism; the third proposes a neohumanist criti-
cal theory; the last pieces take up two philosophers who best em-
body the classical and the romantic ideals, Plato and Nietzsche. 
Frye's most seminal essay introduces the first number. Entitled 
"The Terms 'Classic' and 'Romantic'," it sets forth the philosophical 
and aesthetic point d'appui of Frye and most of the other 
neohumanists. 2 Romanticism is of course their great antagonist, 
and one cannot do better than to quote Frye's own catalog of its 
qualities: 
A susceptibility to irregular beauty, a fondness for the striking and the unusual even 
at the expense of regularity and order. a preference for fascinating detail above 
symmetry and proportion. a predilection for the coruscations of style-for the glit-
tering word and phrase, for the exotic and exquisite epithet. for everything that 
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touches and thrills and dazzles, a hunger for sensation, even when these desires lead 
to a dissipation of the attention-such are its external qualities as far as it is profit-
ahle to analyse them at present. [Po 10] 
Allied with romanticism is naturalism. These may at first seem to be 
opposites: the one esteems subjectivity and passion, and the other 
tends to see man as shaped by external forces; the one traces back 
to Rousseau, the other to Bacon; at their most extreme, the one 
deifies emotion, the other produces the zealous technocrat or be-
haviorist. Yet both view man as too much a part of nature and deny 
the rational, moral, or supernatural elements which make for the 
distinctly human. In addition, they both confound literature with 
"life" (defined as subjective feeling by romanticism, or confined to 
what is empirically demonstrable by naturalism), and consequently 
they have sundered modern literature from the moral idea, which 
in classical literature rightly predominates, To put it another way, 
truly classical or humanistic literature is concerned more to inter-
pret life in the light of ethical ideas rather than "neutrally" to image 
or represent it. Romanticism or naturalism, however, is more in-
terested in life as sensation or spectacle, or at most as an illustration 
of some allegedly scientific or physical law; when it trenches on 
morality, it seldom offers more than trite sentimentality or 
humanitarianism. The journalist is the basest of this type, but even 
the best writers share in his defects, and, for Frye, these include 
Shakespeare, Hugo, Tolstoy, and Zola, 
To the classicist, however, "life is at bottom an illustration of 
moral principles, whose main interest is human and rational" (p. 
20). From classical literature we expect an "unflinching moral vi-
sion" characteristic of such writers as Sophocles; from romantic 
writers we get only the protean and nebulous perspectives of sub-
jectivity. To speak more precisely, in the classical literature we ob-
serve an Oedipus, condemned by his deeds despite his good inten-
tions; in the romantic we have a Hamlet, in whom we are invited to 
pity that very irresoluteness and quivering sensibility which a 
Sophocles would likely have scorned. The Oedipus Rex is thus an 
"ideal" tragedy, while Hamlet is merely a naturalistic tragedy of 
character strongly enforcing no certain moral norms. Sophocles 
views life from an ethical vantage; Shakespeare, like the "amoral" 
romantic or naturalist, throws himself uncritically into its mul-
tifarious and fluctuating phenomena. 
We are at present in a romantic and naturalistic period, but Frye 
sees romanticism and classicism sub specie aeternitatis. They repre-
sent for him two perennial "dispositions of spirit," and he desires a 
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new "fundamental literary criticism" which will be cognizant of 
these two dispositions and scrutinize literature in its unique capac-
ity as a medium of moral ideas. As such a medium, literature dif-
fers from the other fine arts, which are not directly ideational, and 
also from the flux and chaos of life (as the romanticist-naturalist 
defines it). Comparative literature, Frye correctly predicts, will be 
particularly suited to perform this function, for we can define cer-
tain universal ideas and moral principles only by contrast. 
"German Romanticism," the lead essay in the second number, 
dissects more precisely the romantic extreme. Like the romanticists 
arraigned in the first essay, the German writers confuse together 
man and thing. As naturalists they view morality as merely an illu-
sion at whose source are the galvanic responses of the ego; yet as 
romantics they praise these responses-inconsistently in view of 
their mechanistic beliefs-as liberating or self-fulfilling. For 
Americans, Emerson is the most familiar embodiment of these 
views. He has the same "sententious, fragmentary manner": 
What New England transcendentalism amounted to in the end ... was, like German 
romanticism, the apotheosis of a purely ideal and sentimental ego above character 
and conduct at large, and the arbitrary elevation of the dicta of this ego into a code 
of morality .... It is just the philosophy for a race and a generation ... which wishes 
to be free to defraud its neighbours in the morning and boast of its moral elevation 
in the evening. [Po 1 17] 
To this view Frye opposes, not the Greek classicism celebrated in 
his previous essay, but Hinduism with its stress on man's spiritual 
withdrawal into the ideal world from the flux of outward circum-
stance. The dualism inherent in the Hindu scheme particularly 
appeals to him. It properly distinguishes between man and nature 
and emancipates man from the "law for thing, the mechanical de-
terminations of a material cosmos" so beloved of the romanticist-
naturalist (p. 118). Yet in that very emancipation it gives man 
power over himself: self-control. Thus this essay, like the first, 
opposes romantic egoism and naturalist materialism. Here, how-
ever, he bears down on the nineteenth-century Germans and trans-
cendentalists as specific embodiments of this "disposition." And he 
joins to the Greek classicism of the first essay the Hindu expression 
of the same. In this way he demonstrates that classicism is indeed a 
perennial pattern manifested in many ages and cultures. 
Introducing the third number is his "Literature and Criticism," 
and it follows logically the first two. Frye is assiduous to distinguish 
true criticism from both impressionism (romanticism) and histori-
cal scholarship (naturalism). Historical scholarship is concerned 
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with the facts or origin of works of art, true CrItiCism with in-
terpretation; and if, as Frye has posited in the earlier essays, liter-
ature belongs to the moral rather than the naturalistic or scientific 
sphere, then criticism, though not as "scientific" as scholarship, has 
yet a noble purpose: "to liberate the idea, to set free the message 
[the work] has to communicate" (p. 188). The other extreme-
impressionistic criticism-is patently but a manifestation of roman-
ticism in which the reader's ego is substituted for a disinterested 
study of the work. In stressing that criticism should examine the 
work itself, and expecially the moral conception of life set forth 
therein, Frye strikingly anticipates the concerns of the "New Cri-
tics," though he would be wary of the sterile explication de texte and 
avoidance of value judgments characteristic of some of that school. 
But if we are to appreciate his courage and iconoclasm, we must 
recall that Frye was, indeed, writing before the rise of that move-
ment, at a time when historical scholarship was generally esteemed 
above "mere" criticism. For Frye, good literary criticism, like classi-
cal literature, maneuvers between the Scylla of romanticism and 
the Charybdis of naturalism (two monsters which for the 
neohumanists have combined to form a third): 
And inasmuch as the life which is both the subject and object ofliterature, is neither 
scientific nor yet unprincipled but broadly moral; our criticism will be neither scien-
tific nor impressionistic, but will consist in a free play of the intelligence just as life 
does. It will be based on general principles, which, though elastic, are broader than 
the observation of a single case, and which are capable of being explained and 
justified, as our conduct is, rationally and intelligibly, if nothing more. [Po 196] 
Frye's last essays take up Plato and Nietzsche, philosophers who 
exemplify the two antithetical dispositions of spirit. Although some 
may view Plato, the architect of the Republic, as a utopian~,~nd 
protosocialist, Frye and the neohumanists regarded him as a classi-
cist. The Republic is not to be taken literally, but as a kind of 
allegory of the mind or human society. Frye admires in Plato what 
he praised in Hinduism: the stress on the superiority of ideas to the 
mundane flux and on the supremacy of order and hierarchy in the 
individual soul and in society. He also shares Plato's distrust of the 
egalitarian ideal, the product equally of romantic and naturalistic 
prejudice. He concedes that Plato's hierarchical scheme appears at 
times too rigorous and petrific, and that its socialistic propensities 
are apt to obscure the value of the individual. Yet finally Plato, in 
his politics, is like the good writer and the good critic. In em-
phasizing the human and the ethical element, he preserves gov-
ernment from becoming either an undisciplined democracy III 
which the lower passions prevail, or a "mere technology." 
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Frye's last substantial essay is a full-dress assault on romanticism 
and-in Frye's view-its most noisy and notorious prophet. The 
first section, a biography proper, is an artful and engrossing narra-
tive, pervaded by a delicate irony, though indeed the second sec-
tion, addressing Nietzsche's thought, is no less ironical. Nietzsche is 
protrayed as the opposite of Plato: a disbeliever in the Ideas, even 
in truth as such, and a romantic enthusiast of the emotions and the 
ego. At the same time, he is the supreme naturalist in his yearning 
for a superman who will manage and purify society. And just as 
Plato, the more Frye contemplated him, seemed a source of true 
wisdom, so in Nietzsche "almost all our modern heresies ... find an 
oracular mouthpiece-with the one exception of social democracy. 
He was born to be the prophet of the one-sided and unbalanced" 
(p. 332). 
Frye's essays, placed as they all are at the beginnings of the ear-
liest issues, deliberately propound a coherent and sophisticated 
point of view. In the first, the chief oppositions of the classic and 
romantic sensibilities are delineated. In the rest of the essays, the 
classical mode is exemplified by Hinduism, Platonism, and 
Sophoclean tragedy, while egotism, naturalism, and scientism are 
embodied variously in such men as Shakespeare, the German 
romantics, and Emerson. The series concludes with a penetrating 
and acidulous study of Nietzsche as the great heresiarch and pro-
phet of modernism. 
Through these essays run principles and preoccupations com-
monly discovered in the neohumanists: an emphasis on the moral 
and ideational aspects of literature joined with a distrust of litera-
ture or criticism concerned with mere spectacle, the physical world, 
or emotion; a belief in the inherent veracity of dualism with its 
distinctions between reason and passion, man and nature, the one 
(the central, the universal) and the many (the flux); a distrust of 
emotionalism and egotism and subjectivism, whether in literature, 
criticism, or life, accompanied by a concern for self-restraint, the 
inner check-in short, for personal, social, and philosophical order; 
a distrust also of the more exorbitant claims of positivism and sci-
entism, but at the same time a refusal to appeal explicitly to the 
theologies or dogmas of conventional religion (in their place we are 
offered Eastern religion, Platonism, or Arnold's free play of the 
moral intelligence). These positions are occupied with great intri-
cacy of analysis and forcibleness of style, and though Frye posses-
sed firm views, the scholar and critic seldom sink into the partisan. 
Frye's very point d'appui-the distinction between classicism and 
romanticism-was from the start attacked as too rigid, and later 
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scholars have argued strongly for abolishing the terms altogether. 
Yet they have continued to be useful, and many critics, in their 
efforts to shun them, have lapsed into an even less helpful and 
more repulsive jargon. Moreover, there is much to be said for 
Frye's belief that the terms denote two perennial philosophies or at 
least sensibilities, similar in essence if different in details. The dis-
tinctions between the two, which may seem heavy-handed in sum-
mary, seldom strike one as so in Frye's practical criticism. He is 
weakest, I believe, on Shakespeare, though it is not uncommon for 
classicists to be immune from that "Shakespeare idolatry" still very 
powerful among professors of English. Certainly his views on the 
German romantics and the transcendentalists are very plausible. I 
shall consider in my general conclusion his refusal-and that of the 
neohumanists in general-to appeal to Christian theology. 
Perhaps in the end style is Frye's best claim to distinction among 
his fellow neohumanists. Elegant without decadence, subtle in vo-
cabulary but vigorous in tone, it has the confidence but not, in the 
main, the distracting vaticinations and tendentiousness of Babbitt's. 
P. E. More's style, at least in his later works, seems more effortless 
but also less memorable and pungent. 
SECTION Two: 
SHERLOCK BRONSON GASS 
S. B. Gass was born in Ohio in 1878, studied at the University of 
Chicago, and came to Nebraska in 1905. He was self-professedly a 
neohumanist and recognized as such in the 1930 manifesto 
Humanism and America. He is recalled by a colleague as "one who 
could question currently fashionable opinion."3 His essays are not 
mere echoes of Frye, but also show the influence of the less 
belligerent, more diffusive humanism of H. B. Alexander. 4 He is 
less vehement in his tone than Frye, and more psychological than 
philosophical in his manner. 
Gass is most clearly Frye'S protege in his first article, "The Intru-
sions of Science." This appeared in the first number with Frye's 
piece on classicism and romanticism, and it elaborates several 
themes introduced in that essay. Agreeing that the naturalist and 
the romantic are congeners, he reproaches the arrogance and 
dogmatism of the scientist, who, he argues, is particularly vulnera-
ble to the blandishments of romanticism; the scientist has de-
veloped no classical sensibility to withstand them. 5 In a very acute 
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analysis, Gass shows how the sciences shade off into the humanities 
as their subjects become increasingly connected with life and hence 
less susceptible to the imposition of strict categories (for example, 
mathematics is more "exact" than biology, which is more so than 
history, which is more so than sociology, and so on) (pp. 67-68). 
Literary scholars, in endeavoring to be scientists, have thus con-
ceived a scorn for the "inexact" art of criticism. But the critic, 
argues Gass, understands his own province and is concerned with 
determining the true value and significance of a work. The natu-
ralistic scholars make a fuss over the historical circumstances of a 
Hamlet, for example, but to what end unless someone is also pre-
pared to delineate the essential value of the play itself (pp. 69-70)? 
Like Frye, Gass thus anticipates in some respects the "New Critics." 
The quasi-scientific procedures employed by literary historians 
have promoted a decline or even desuetude of critical judgment, so 
that the slightest work may be prized, not for any inherent merit, 
but because it is old and thus provides grist for the ever grinding 
mills of the historical scholars. Criticism must understand its pur-
pose better and resist the supposedly value-free methods of natu-
ralism. 
The influence of Frye also dominates another essay, "Literature 
as a Fine Art."6 Gass sees romanticism as an assertion of the senses 
against the intellect, and develops further Frye's distinctions be-
tween literature and the other arts. Literature communicates ideas 
or thoughts; it is essentially intellectual. A picture, on the other 
hand, does not directly convey ideas, for that is the province only of 
language: the same may be said of music, sculpture, architecture; 
hence they appeal especially to the romantic. Of course these arts 
may evoke ideas, and much thought may have entered into their 
execution; that is another matter (pp. 280-82). We must not, he 
continues, acquiesce in the flux of sublunary reality as the 
romanticist-naturalist does. Rather, reason must postulate stable 
prototypes in defiance of the flux, and this it should do even if we 
are not totally convinced of the actual reality of the ideal prototype 
(p. 285). Classic literature must try to apprehend the universal 
ideas and types, but modern, neoromantic trends like imagism are 
quite unsatisfactory; obsessed as they are with particularity, they 
have abandoned the ideational purpose of literature (pp. 287-88). 
One should note two aspects of Gass's thought particularly. For 
developing more relentlessly than Frye the distinctions between 
literature and the other arts, Gass would no doubt be rebuked by a 
number of modern critics. In the face of semiotics and a more 
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flexible understanding of the meaning of symbols, Gass's distinc-
tions seem now too facile and uncompromising. Second, when dis-
cussing the imposition of types or ideas on the universal flux, Gass 
occupies a significantly more subjective or psychological position 
than Frye. Frye seems to believe that Plato viewed the Ideas as a 
means of apprehending true reality, and he seems to have shared 
that belief. Gass, on the other hand, tends to see our construction of 
the prototypes as a way of rendering reality intelligible. This is an 
important if complicated difference, the difference between per-
ception and projection; but Gass does not indicate explicitly that he 
understands the philosophical distance between him and Frye on 
that matter. It must be conceded, of course, that scholars have not 
agreed on what Plato himself meant by the Ideas: perhaps Gass 
recognized this coil and decided it would be inutile to pursue the 
distinction. 
In "The Comedy of the Arts College" Gass addresses an al-
together fresh topic and exhibits a greater independence of 
thought. The arts college had once a high calling, for once "it had 
stood in the midst of the chaos of life, stably anchored in the flux, 
offering to those who came to it that detached, clarified vision and 
perspective to which it itself had attained." But now, in courting 
"the current romantic eccentricity," it has abandoned its tradition-
ary concern and assumed "the intense and baffled look of the sub-
ject of comedy" (p. 268). Gass believes that students actually expect 
from the arts college some coherent and unified discipline. This 
coherence will also assist the teacher, for he will have a better no-
tion when he enters his classroom of the preparation of his students 
and can therefore function more effectively as an instructor. A set 
curriculum, then, provides some order for the student, and at the 
same time allows the teacher to construct his course upon a sound 
foundation. The elective system, however, not only ensures aim-
lessness in the curriculum, but compels the professor, like the mer-
chant, to survive by attracting customers. It is "a system calculated 
to exercise every human weakness of both instructor and student" 
(p. 274). Gass perceives the liabilities of a fixed curriculum-
narrowness, inelasticity, etc.-but regards as worse the chaos inher-
ent in the elective system (p. 277). Irving Babbitt had already de-
nounced that system as "educational impressionism" in Literature 
and the College (1908), but Gass's criticism is arguably more subtle 
than Babbitt's, and really one of the shrewdest analyses of the elec-
tive system. 
Gass's last two major essays, "A Modern Paradox" and "A Liberal 
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Experience," best embody his tentative and psychological ap-
proach. These both use narrative and dialogue and were later in-
corporated into a curious, philosophical novel, A Lover of the Chair. 
They are the most original of his contributions to the Quarterly, but 
also the least amenable to paraphrase. In both, the elements of 
narrative and dialogue are intrinsic to the theme and impart to the 
pieces a suggestive and hypothetical tone conspicuously different 
from the energy and aggressiveness of Frye. The first essay con-
cerns methods of education, and concludes that democracies, to 
survive, must train their majorities to govern themselves. A purely 
vocational education cannot accomplish this, for it appeals chiefly 
to the private, selfish interests-the "needs" they would be called 
today-of the people. A democracy will destroy itself if it becomes 
too narrowly "practical" in its educational policies. At the same 
time, a separate, aristocratic education clashes too sharply with the 
ideals of a democracy. Hence the paradox: an egalitarian society 
must preserve in its educational system an "elitist" element if it is to 
ensure a body of citizens educated in the loftier ideals and pre-
pared to sacrifice material benefits for them. In "A Liberal Experi-
ence" Gass touches again on the fragmentary nature of modern 
education, and chides liberalism for having at its center no moral 
idea, but only a sympathy for the poor: a virtue, doubtless, but no 
philosophy.7 
Gass's first two essays show the intelligent pupil expounding on 
the favorite themes of his mentor: the liabilities of romanticism, the 
preeminence of the moral idea in literature. The essay on the arts 
college, however, is an impressive defense of a traditional cur-
riculum, argued not only on conservative Platonic, but on liberal 
psychological, grounds (a set curriculum truly gives the students 
what they both want and need, and makes for more effective 
teachers as well). But Gass is most innovative in the last two essays, 
which are in effect little dramas or dialogues decorated with 
characters individualized just enough to intrigue us without dis-
tracting us from the philosophical issues. These dramatic essays 
work towards an indirect, gentle criticism of liberal 
humanitarianism. Always there is the reluctance to offend, to be 
churlish or uncharitable, to deny the good feelings and genuine 
altruism of the other side; hence the dialogue form, delicate and 
psychological in its nature, is no mere factitious embellishment, but 
an integral part. 
Gass's contributions do at least two things: they build on and 
develop ideas introduced in Frye's series of essays, and they employ 
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a manner better calculated to appeal to the hesitant but open-
minded reader. Frye is the more expert writer and possibly the 
more rigorous thinker; yet he pursues a more treacherous path. 
His essays will inspire, excite, and probably sophisticate, those who 
are already receptive to his philosophy. But some will be alienated 
by a sort of testiness of style. It is not altogether fanciful to see in 
Frye the Juvenalian, and in Gass the Horatian, arm of 
neohumanism, Nebraska chapter. 
SECTION THREE: 
PHILO M. BUCK, JR. 
Philo M. Buck, Jr., was Gass's exact contemporary. Born in New 
Jersey in 1877, he was graduated from Ohio Wesleyan and Har-
vard, and came to Nebraska in 1910. Presently he became involved 
in administrative work, and in 1926 left to be chairman of the 
Department of Comparative Literature at the University of Wis-
consin. Buck was one of the associate editors of the Quarterly, and 
its chief editor during Frye's leave of absence. He wrote many 
essays for it reflecting a neohumanist perspective, and it is arguable 
that these pieces remain his best work. 8 
In "Literature and Anti-Intellectualism" he attacks Bergson, who 
had been lecturing in 1913 at Columbia. Bergsonism is anti-
intellectual in its romantic intuitionalism and its belief in ultimate 
reality as movement or pure flux. Such a reality, Buck argues, can 
have no signification, for "the restless, ever-changing flux of life, as 
we perceive it in our emotions or our intuitions, has no more stable 
ground for its truth than our reasoned abstractions" (p. 83). Im-
bued with the modern repudiation of reason and intellect, natu-
ralism has persuaded us that we can have no definitive ethical 
standards. All that remains for us, then, is emotional value: "Hence 
the ruck of pictures, poems, and stories dealing with idiots, pau-
pers, monsters, misfits generally, in bizarre, demoralizing, or de-
humanising situations. Emotional significance is the only test the 
[romantic] school can find, and to realise it art and literature must 
seek the lives of those who defy humanity and the human tradi-
tion" (p. 89).9 Buck's point is that the Bergsonian anti-intellectual 
and the scientist or naturalist conciliate too eagerly the ethical neu-
trality of the physical world. Regardless of whether moral order 
can be demonstrated to be "in nature" or not, man has a natural 
craving for it that must be satisfied. The purpose of art is to de-
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lineate the distinctively human qualities such as "character, reason, 
ideals, morals." These, "though we may look in vain for them in the 
flux, though they may be conventions or more or less inadequate 
generalisations, must not be regarded as a flippancy, an irrele-
vancy, a cosmic jest. And it is with these human things that art and 
literature have to do" (p. 92). Buck is closer to Gass than to Frye in 
affirming only tentatively the absolute existence of moral ideas. 
Indeed, he sometimes seems to lapse into what Frye or Babbitt 
would have denigrated as modernist subjectivism and to admit that 
we impose our own "absolutes" on the universal chaos. But even at 
such moments he urges that we respect such impositions because 
they are intrinsically and imperatively human. 
Buck's other major essays are dialogues, a form which he adopts, 
like Gass, to give his views dramatic appeal and resilience. In 
"Curbs" he accuses the vers librists of discarding all tradition and 
pandering to the worst in modern thought: the slipshod, the facile. 
Though they claim to be egalitarian, they are in fact aristocratic, 
and none indeed more so than Whitman, strutting in his most 
unplebeian white suit. In abandoning all rules or curbs, they are 
sequestering themselves from humanity and the authentic life of 
the humane tradition and seeking solace in subjectivism and ir-
rationalism: "Pretty soon someone will advocate an abandonment 
of language, and insist that true poetry consists in the rhythm of 
gestures and facial expression" (p. 202). It is evident that this asper-
sion of free verse-an assault, by the way, not merely academic but 
fortified by some practicing poets like Frost-grows naturally out 
of the suppositions of his earlier article. Indeed, though he never 
quotes it, Buck seems to be arguing Burke's famous aphorism, "Art 
is man's nature"-far from being false to nature, we are being true 
to ourselves when we construct order (societies, moral systems, 
symbols) around us. Despite the naturalist skepticism of a moral 
design intrinsic to nature, man has a natural need for such a pat-
tern, and art must answer that need. 
Two of Buck's most inventive essays concern education. "Mag-
nacum Confusione" laments the chaotic college curricula, affirms 
the utility of classical education in the democratic state, and argues 
that while progressive educators may oppose the hidebound tradi-
tionalism of a classical education, they call at the same time for such 
state supervision and control as may foster a tyrannical and nar-
rowly utilitarian pedagogy. 
In "Puero Reverentia" Buck dramatizes with wit and sensitivity 
two fundamental and probably antithetical attitudes towards ele-
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mentary education. We are shown on the one hand the zealous 
proponents of the Montessori method, for whom the child is a free 
soul to be joyously educated in all its spontaneity and innocence. 
On the other hand, we have those who advocate discipline and 
direction to overcome the natural debilities of childhood: "Do we 
think that deep in the hidden recesses of the child's soul lies hid the 
germ that shall one day blossom out in multiplication tables and 
trigonometric formulae? Is the love of grammatical forms and 
graphs innate and imbedded in a child's nature? Can we call out the 
resolute will to face stern duty by morning romps over castles of 
cardboard?" (p. 178). True, we must sometimes have the sugar-
coated pill, but some pedagogues confound the sugar with the 
substance. Through the dialogue form, Buck tolerantly but face-
tiously dramatizes the essential incompatibility of these two at-
titudes: attitudes between which the pendulum of pedagogical 
fashion still swings regularly if in ever widening arcs. The weakest 
claim of the apologists of Montessori, he contends, is that it is 
universally applicable and can be extended into the upper reaches 
of education: "There comes a time, and that earlier than most of us 
suspect, when the child must turn inward as well as outward. The 
baby is probably right in regarding itself as the centre of the uni-
verse, but age should learn better" (pp. 185-86). 
In "Americanism" he criticizes "the amazing ease with which we 
change our opinions and our parties, tinker with our constitutions, 
make and unmake laws, and regard with ill-concealed contempt all 
the government machinery and laws we have set up as mere ex-
periments whose worth is only to be measured by their immediate 
results" (p. 259). Like Frye, he uses Plato to censure the extremities, 
vacillations, and hypocrisies of the democratic system. 
Buck, then, is a neohumanist in his preference for order over 
flux, his skeptical view of the pretensions of naturalism and pro-
gressive education, his concern that literature remain true to the 
values traditionally attached to humanism. And as the last essay 
illustrates, his conservatism, like all good conservatism, promul-
gates no obdurate adherence to the status quo. While he never 
attacks democracy in itself, he is alert to its opacities and en-
thusiasms, and swings willingly the hammer of the iconoclast. lo 
Buck's essays serve much the same function as Gass's: he develops 
Frye's ideas, applies them to matters ignored by Frye, and employs 
a more ingratiating and tentative manner. Finally, it is interesting 
to note that just as Gass's most useful contribution to neohumanist 
thought is his critique of the university elective system, so Buck's is 
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his good-natured but penetrating analysis of the limitations and 
doubtful assumptions of Montessori. 
SECTION FOUR: 
HARTLEY BURR ALEXANDER 
H. B. Alexander, like Buck an associate editor of the Quarterly, was 
a regular contributor and one of the best known nationally of the 
Nebraska humanists. A native of Lincoln born in 1873, he studied 
at Nebraska and Columbia, then returned to the Department of 
Philosophy at Nebraska. Without becoming a dilettante, he pur-
sued an astonishing range of interests, publishing widely in the 
areas of lexicography, aesthetics, philosophy, folklore, mythology, 
and political theory. He was an active humanitarian and a practic-
ing poet. In 1925 he lectured at the Sorbonne on the American 
Indian. In addition, he was much interested in architecture, sup-
plying the inscriptions and contributing to the symbolism of the 
Nebraska State Capitol and other public buildingsY His pieces in 
the Quarterly show him to be a resolute humanist, but markedly 
different from Frye, Cass, and Buck. 
The differences are clearly established in his first essay, "The 
Socratic Bergson," where he quite disagrees with Buck's denigra-
tion of that philosopher. Instead, he includes Bergson within the 
humanist tradition along with Socrates, Augustine, Descartes, and 
Kant; each "sought to know first of all his own soul." In addition, 
they were all concerned with moral knowledge as it pertained to 
conduct, "knowledge that joins to action"; this is the only truly 
humanistic sort (p. 33). He chiefly admires Bergson for refraining 
from abstract and dialectical thought, a virtue allegedly shared by 
Alexander's other favorite thinkers. Mental gymnastics can doubt-
less be good exercise, "but it is Cod alone who can always geome-
trise. For mere mortals the urgency of conduct is fundamental in 
life ... ethics is the essential science; ontology and logic are 
luxuries of the fortunate" (p. 34).12 Like Frye and the others, he 
often appeals to Platonism, but in his discussions he commonly 
emphasizes Socrates the teacher rather than his brilliant but more 
systematic pupil. This bias preponderates in all of Alexander's 
works: a strong distrust of overconceptualizing and excessive 
analysis. In his magnum opus, for example, God and Man's Destiny, 
he takes up the personhood of the Deity and the existential drama 
of Christianity, deliberately ignoring, almost contemning, its 
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dogma and theology. Alexander thought naturally in architectural 
symbols, and in the present essay he offers as an example of ram-
pant schematizing the Mormon Temple at Salt Lake: 
the most horrible monument I have ever beheld .... it is built with deadly symmetry 
of line and angle, every joint conspicuous and every unity in relief,-exactly as a 
child might build with blocks; and what makes it so horrible is just that it is infantile 
in conception and monstrous in size ... we get from it the very shiver which the 
deeds of the Cyclopes gave the Greeks. [Po 41],3 
He esteems in Bergson, then, precisely those qualities repugnant to 
a Frye or Buck. Bergson, for Alexander, is not anti-intellectual. His 
intuitionalism is a proper, humanist recognition of the limits of 
rationalism. His stress on movement is not a pusillanimous conces-
sion to the flux but a sign of his realism and a "studied protest 
against the artifice and inconsequence of our mental legerdemain" 
(p. 42). 
Alexander's disagreement with the neohumanists is even sharper 
in " 'Laokoon' and the Prior Question." There he examines recent 
aesthetic theories of poetry, including Babbitt's New Laokoon, and 
discerns in them all the sin of overdichotomizing. Babbitt, he says, 
claims to be both a classicist and a humanist, and he argues for 
restraint, the inner check, concentration of the will, etc. On the 
other hand, H. N. Fairchild, another humanist, palpably espouses 
romantic notions, and admires in poetry such qualities as self-
projection and self-realization. And yet, Alexander argues, the 
"prior humanistic maxim, 'Know thyself,' " supports the conten-
tions of both Babbitt and Fairchild. Moreover, these apparently op-
posed critics drive toward similar humanist conclusions. For Bab-
bitt (and using Babbitt's own words), the "mediation between the 
One and the Many ... is the highest wisdom of life"; for Fairchild 
(again using his own words), the true value of poetry lies in the 
"feeling of unity attained and continuity of experience empha-
sised." Alexander finds in these statements a difference that is 
"verbal rather than speculative" (p. 347). He concludes that the 
neohumanist opposition between classical and romantic disposi-
tions is inutile: "The sharp antithesis of sense and intellect, feeling 
and will, imagination and reason, we must reject as inherently false, 
and conducive only to hypostatical idols and epithetical combats" 
(p. 355). 
These dichotomies at bottom, he maintains, merely contrast the 
particular with the general, or the changing with the changeless. 
The dialectical terms classic and romantic refer to attitudes toward 
experience and methods of presenting impressions drawn from 
nature, and he agrees with Frye that, mutatis mutandis, they are 
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perennial. But neither method, approaching experience from the 
general or the particular, can justly claim to be the true source of all 
wisdom. And if what is called romanticism can degenerate into the 
egotistic and subjective, classicism can become superficial and rigid 
(pp. 355-56). A true humanist, Alexander believes, will not feel 
threatened by the new areas excavated by modern thought. The 
neohumanists "are too often men made timid by possessions, fear-
ful of venturing the new lest they cease to prize what they already 
have"; they are too eager to reduce romanticism to arrogance or 
lunacy (pp. 356-57). " 'Laokoon' and the Prior Question" is thus a 
superb complement and contrast to Frye's fundamental essay on 
the terms classic and romantic. Frye is the pugilist, alert to differ-
ences and keen to draw lines; Alexander is the moderator, sensible 
of the similarities among humanists and zealous for the common 
ground: the fundamental or "prior" question, Do I understand 
myself? From Frye's perspective Alexander is something of a 
monist, though Alexander himself would probably have denied 
that epithet. 
Alexander's other essays, though less substantial, are consistent 
with the humanism displayed in the first two. In "Music and 
Poetry" he is less critical of nineteenth-century romanticism than 
the neohumanists: at least it was willing, despite its faults, "to dare 
all things" (p. 143). In "The Philosophy of Tragedy" he defines 
Aristotelian catharsis as the production in the audience of "some-
thing of a broader understanding of life, something of the divine 
compassion for all things human"-an interpretation of the term 
by now sufficiently orthodox, but first promoted by theorists in-
clined toward romanticism. 14 In "Enemy Language" he takes up a 
question glanced at by Gass and Buck: What are the social and 
political values, in a democracy, of foreign language study? Al-
though America may be truly styled the great melting pot, Alexan-
der prefers variety to uniformity. We cannot expect every citizen to 
be "melted down to the hue of the Revolutionary Anglo-Saxon." 
We should encourage the immigrants to bring with them the best 
from their traditions, and the best is usually formulated in the best 
literature. "Traditions are not made in a day, and traditions which 
are ideals purified out of centuries of experience are treasures not 
to be disregarded" (p. 109). There is no doubt he would applaud 
the current emphasis on polylingualism in education. 
Alexander is thus a very different species of humanist from those 
we have been considering. He challenges their classic-romantic 
dichotomies; he is not so distressed by the sublunary flux-indeed 
sometimes he delights in it-or by the audacities of naturalism. His 
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Platonism, with its characteristically Socratic bent, does not bring 
with it the familiar, neohumanist distrust of democracy; and his 
admiration of Bergson certainly sets him apart. 15 His criticism of 
the "melting pot" theory of cultural assimilation-a criticism com-
mon enough nowadays-was unusual at the time, and at odds with 
the neohumanist bias towards uniformitarianism. Through his es-
says in general there circulates a freer and less fervid air than that 
to be sniffed among the neohumanists. The grinding of axes is less 
obtrusive. An advocate of the "prior maxim," he is conciliatory in 
tone. One admires, finally, the balance he achieved in his own 
career between the active and the contemplative life. 16 
Yet there are weaknesses allied to these virtues, of which the 
greatest is imprecision and nebulosity. If Socrates, Descartes, Kant, 
and Bergson are all humanists because they are great truth-seekers 
occupied with what is essentially human, it is difficult to imagine 
any thinker of stature who might be excluded from this tradition. 
Indeed, to denominate it a tradition in the first place is otiose, for it 
wants uniqueness. On what grounds, for example, does a foe of 
systematizing like Alexander choose to include Descartes in his 
pantheon? Then, too, there is a kind of quiet optimism winding 
through his essays which contrasts with the darker premonitions of 
the neohumanists and which, depending on one's view, is either 
healthy or complacent. Indeed, it all depends on one's view 
whether Alexander be considered tolerant, open-minded, and re-
silient, or, at times at least, fuzzy and sentimental, with an aptitude, 
quite absent in the likes of Frye, to lapse into trite passages of 
"moral uplift." Is his contempt for analytics and dialectics a sign of 
philosophical emancipation or, rather, symptomatic of a refusal to 
think and discriminate precisely? Is he, in fine, a complex, 
category-defying sage like Samuel Johnson, or a more talented but 
intellectually befuddled second-rate dilettante like Elbert Hub-
bard? No doubt he is somewhere in between; and in any event, he is 
the only one of the Nebraska humanists who represents that more 
relaxed and diffusive sort of humanism to which the majority of 
academics in the twentieth century have probably subscribed. 
SECTION FIVE: 
LOUISE POUND 
Like Alexander, Louise Pound was a native of Lincoln, born a year 
before him in 1872. She studied at Nebraska and the University of 
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Heidelberg, then returned to Nebraska to produce over two 
hundred articles and books on linguistics and folklore. Her four 
pieces in the Quarterly are fine examples of her earlier work, and 
the best two, on ballads, reflect strongly her interests at this time. In 
1915, for example, she published a monograph, Folk-song of Ne-
braska and the Central West, to be followed by Poetic Origins and the 
Ballad (1921) and a collection, American Ballads and Songs (1922). All 
four of the Quarterly essays are neohumanist in outlook. 
In her first, "The Literary Interregnum," she attempts to explain 
the present dearth of talented writers by arguing that this is a 
transitional period in which the old material has been worn out and 
the new not yet developed. There will, inexorably, be new 
thoughts, needs, and so forth, but the odds for poetry are not good. 
The public demand is for prose, and so to prose, she correctly 
predicts, the ablest writers will repair. Again correctly, she foresees 
for poetry "the rhymeless lyric verse" and the general abandon-
ment of conventional poetic diction. Finally, she agrees explicitly 
with Babbitt that, having endured a centrifugal period during 
which artists were enticed with eldritch and eccentric themes, we 
may now anticipate a counter, centripetal movement "in the direc-
tion of centralisation, instead of miscellaneous expansion" (p. 81). 
Her next essay, "Emerson as a Romanticist," shows even more 
strongly the influence of Babbitt and, probably, Frye. In Frye's vein 
she sees Emerson, like Whitman, as an exponent of the Roussellian 
culte de moi; far from being a democrat, he was unsocial and a snob 
to boot. The Victorians may have profited from his advice to leave 
books and rely on intuition, but "to the modern reader, in reaction 
from individualism, Arnold seems the wiser guide. The mediocre 
must not be encouraged to trust themselves too confidently, re-
jecting the help which may come from culture" (p. 190). Also, 
Emerson's benevolism and optimism now seem pathetically dated. 
Emerson, for Pound, is the chief American adherent of that Euro-
pean romanticism castigated by Frye, and she concludes her piece 
by contrasting the emotionalism and self-consciousness of the 
nineteenth-century poets with the superior detachment and imper-
sonality of the great writers, such as Homer, Chaucer, and Shake-
speare (p. 194). 
Her last two essays are more typical of her later work. In "New-
World Analogues of the English and Scottish Popular Ballads" she 
challenges two prevailing theories respecting the evolution of En-
glish popular ballads in the Old and New World: first, that those 
ballads originated communally; and second, that the period of bal-
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lad making is over. Her evidence and train of logic defy brief 
summary. She argues, basically, that poems of clear communal ori-
gin are deficient in facture, style, imagery, whereas the well-
constructed ballads point to a single, educated author (for example, 
the songs of Stephen Foster are apt to endure much longer than 
the "inconsequent creations emerging from the 'communal impro-
visation' of the negroes themselves" [po 178n]). Moreover, the fac-
titious ballads are usually about the upper classes, while authentic 
people's ballads are about themselves, and are artistically inferior. 
Popular literature that has stood the test of time shows certain 
signs, if not always of genius, at least of professionalism. She con-
cludes that the best western American folk songs "are not those 
which are the work of uneducated people of the Middle West or 
the South, in spontaneous collaboration," but are the performance 
of individuals, or adaptations from English and Scottish works, 
themselves produced by individuals. She also argues that the mak-
ing of ballads is by no means over. However, communal theories of 
origins "have emerged from and ... belong to a period which 
deliberately preferred the vague and the mystical, for all problems 
of literary and linguistic history," and hence those theories are "out 
of key in a distinctly anti-romantic period like our own .... Perhaps 
when the cloud of romanticism overhanging it has vanished utterly, 
we may again come to look on balladry as did the cultivated world in 
the days of humanism" (p. 187). 
"Ballads and the Illiterate" gives further arguments and exam-
ples to fortify her thesis that unlettered compositions are in fact 
rudimentary, and that the theory of "minstrel authorship" is far 
more persuasive than the communal theory (pp. 284-85). 
Moreover, earlier versions of ballads are commonly superior to the 
later, and exhibit unmistakable signs of artistry (pp. 287-88). "The 
songs which impress the folk and find vitality among them are not 
the uninteresting and nearly negligible kind of thing which they 
are able to produce themselves" (p. 286). 
With the possible exception of Alexander, Pound is more in-
terested in popular literature and linguistics than the other Ne-
braska humanists. There is a notable freshness in both her style and 
her choice of topics, especially in the last two essays. But her values 
and attitudes are much closer to those of the neohumanists than to 
Alexander's. The influence of Babbitt and Frye is quite apparent. 
Like them, she is tired of the romantic chaos and looks forward to a 
period of discipline and concentration; like them, she finds little 
inspiring in the Emerson-Whitman side of the American tradition, 
The Nebraska Humanists / 19 
preferring the more conservative Matthew Arnold. Her essays on 
ballads, it should be noted, have a particularly antiromantic cast. A 
pioneer in the scholarly study of popular literature, she is not 
seduced, like some who have followed her, into sentimental cant 
about "people's literature." Genuinely admiring the good old bal-
lads, she pays them the honor of believing that they were prod uced 
by talented individuals and did not erupt mysteriously out of some 
amorphous and chthonic imagination. She is always determined to 
discriminate the good from the mediocre or bad, and never per-
mits these distinctions to be obscured by the glamour of egalitarian 
aesthetics. 17 In fine, she understands that superior works of art, 
whether in the popular field or not, are exertions of the individual 
will, organizing into significant patterns the flux of existence. In 
this she is one with the other neohumanists, and her theories have 
been largely favored by supervening scholarship. IS 
SECTION SIX: 
W. G. LANGWORTHY TAYLOR 
Because Taylor was in the Department of Economics and Political 
Science, it may seem odd to consider him a humanist. However, he 
explicitly identified himself with conservatism 19 and wrote on 
humanistic subjects as well as those within his competence profes-
sionally. He is the oldest of the academics surveyed here, having 
been born in 1859 in New York City. He was educated at Harvard, 
studied in Paris and the University of Leipzig, and joined the Uni-
versity of Nebraska in 1893. Though he became professor emeritus 
in 1911 (at fifty-two), he continued to be very industrious, pub-
lishing his most important book, The Credit System, in 1913. Shortly 
after his major articles appeared in the Quarterly, he became a most 
voluble proponent of Woodrow Wilson's war policies and an 
acidulous critic of those of his colleagues allegedly tainted by 
pacifism or socialism. 20 His two most interesting contributions to 
the Quarterly are long dialogues featuring, as a persona or spokes-
man, "the Man from the Moon." In the old, theological astronomy 
all things above the moon were held to be permanent, and all 
things below (sublunary) were suqject to the flux. I have already 
noted how strongly the neohumanists detested the flux and its 
apparent apologists (for example, Bergson). It is therefore appro-
priate that Taylor's persona should be a denizen of the moon, for 
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as such he exhibits a perspective akin to that of the eighteenth-
century "spectator": detached, self-possessed, sometimes ironic. 
The philosophical dialogue, as a genre, is quite versatile, and 
certainly Taylor's dialogues could not be more different from those 
of Gass and Buck. He does not, like them, exploit the form to 
illuminate the intellectual and psychological complexity of the issue 
under consideration; his tone is not, like theirs, tentative; there is 
no compassionate survey of both sides while, Horatian-like, gently 
drawing the reader to the better one. On the contrary, Taylor's 
style is by comparison peppery, crisp, wittily assertive. The 
dialogues of Buck and Gass draw their force from their probing of 
subtleties and nuances of disputation and personality; despite their 
authors' dislike of romanticism, the essays themselves seem curi-
ously romantic, even Keatsian, in their protean and resilient form. 
Taylor, on the other hand, is hard, opinionative, sometimes abra-
sive. He is, au fond, a satirist who in tone and technique is some-
where between Addison and Aristophanes, though to be sure on a 
lower plane than both. 
The first essay is entitled "The Man from the Moon, a J efferso-
nian, and a Socialist." Despite his individualism, Jefferson has been 
momentarily entranced by socialism and its apparent concern for 
the commonality. But the man from the moon, attempting to exor-
cise this fascination, argues that capitalists indeed contribute to the 
welfare of the state and manage economic affairs with infinitely 
more sagaciousness than any state bureaucracy might do. State 
socialism, he believes, cannot pay its own way, and such forms as we 
have of it depend in reality on private enterprise. Further, there is 
no reason to imagine that the state would be a more benevolent 
employer than the capitalist, or that there would be no strikes in 
such a scheme: "the abuse of the convict in the chain gang gives 
some idea what is in store for the government employee who hap-
pens to belong to a political minority or to some department of 
production or class of the population which is not in favour" (p. 
302). The general public is persuaded by newspapers, professors, 
and politicians always to' side with the workman, but we should 
rather admire the captain of industry, who must needs "extract a 
social service from a horde of half-savage anthropoids, eager to 
murder or dynamite upon an artful suggestion applied to their 
unresisting, inflammable nerves." We should respect those em-
ployers who daily risk their lives facing down mobs and bearing 
"the brunt of an unsympathetic public opinion, worked by yellow 
journalism" (p. 302). After all, it is necessary that somebody organize 
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labor, and there is much evidence to show that capitalists are more 
interested in the permanent betterment of the people as a whole, 
even while they work for their own interests, than are the trade 
unions or government bureaucracies. 
The subject is then shifted to foreign affairs, and Jefferson 
proudly if tritely proclaims that he is in favor of Mexico for the 
Mexicans. But the Moon Man responds that the "white man is on 
trial. Can he carry his burden? He cannot evade it. Having worked 
out, in a measure, the problem of justice and spiritual uprightness 
at home, he must not be indifferent to the needs of the rest of the 
world. He cannot shut himself off from extra-territorial mankind. 
He cannot meekly let them dispel him. He must conquer, but like a 
crusader" (p. 306). Jefferson asks if he believes in war, to which he 
replies that the word believe is inappropriate. He faces reality. 
Idealists pronounce war an anachronism, but wars are more fre-
quent than ever. Thus we must make the best of it: our soldiers are 
not only more up-to-date, but more humane, than those of the 
barbarous countries, and can set a good example for them. In 
dealing with the tropical races especially, "the white soldier exerts, 
on the whole, an elevating influence .... the white conquerer is little 
disposed to excesses. The brown man knows no self-restraint toward 
the vanquished. Moreover, the white man is rich enough to reward 
as well as strong enough to punish. Paternal treatment calls for both 
methods" (pp. 308-9). 
The cast of the second dialogue is "The Man from the Moon, an 
American Citizen, a Bull-mooser, and a Suffragette." The Bull 
Mooser of course attacks capitalists as robbers, and the moon man 
defends them; he also defends parliamentary or representative 
government over populism, and the short ballot (less demanding of 
the typical citizen) over the long one. In the most developed sec-
tion, he chides a suffragette. He warns her not to eradicate the 
proverbial, golden-egg-laying goose. Many laws protect women-in 
the factory, in domestic life, and so forth. What, in the name of 
pure equality, will become of these prerogatives? Moreover, he 
notes a deterioration of marriage and the family for which "the 
spirit of suffragism is largely responsible" (p. 165). Well, he later 
concedes, perhaps he is overestimating the effect of female suf-
frage: if the "poor dears" want it, let them have it. But, he warns, 
"men think there is rampant a disposition to ask for everything, 
giving nothing in return. Women will be more than ever, under 
suffrage, exposed to the vicissitudes of competition" (pp. 166-67). 
He then jocosely inquires how much wages the housewife should 
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receive; and the suffragette, more conventional than some of her 
present-day sisters, agrees that the very suggestion is absurd, 
though of course she argues for just pay for true work. The moon 
man concludes on a philosophical note. There is rampant in the 
land, he observes, the notion that the individual is everything and 
should not be expected to accommodate himself to his surround-
ings. In other words, the world owes him a living, and if it does not 
afford him the living he wants, he will revenge himself on it. But, 
says the moon man, this is the argument of the "Apache" or the 
adherent of the IWW who deludes himself into thinking "that cap-
ital has been robbed from the poor, not created by the capitalist. 
Hence he proposes to destroy capital by violating his solemn word, 
as understood in every contract of service, to respect his employer'S 
property. The ends justify the means." To this pernicious view-
point the feminist movement shows signs of succumbing. He con-
cludes: 
Prosperity destroys your world and calls for a new infusion of religion, as erstwhile, in 
the time of the Nazarene. But the readjustment is likely to be unpleasant; it certainly 
has in store some surprises .... I start for the moon this instant else I shall be drawn 
into the campaign of suffretage and sabotage on earth. [Po 169] 
Taylor'S other essays, which are not dialogues, express views 
congenial with these. There is consequently no reason to doubt that 
the man in the moon is Taylor'S own persona. Otherwise, so ex-
travagant are some of his opinions, and so provocative some of his 
rhetoric, that one might be tempted to argue that the persona, like 
the projector in Swift's "Modest Proposal," is to be taken ironically: 
that is, that Taylor himself is perhaps clandestinely a liberal ridi-
culing the troglodytic views of the right wing. But even taken 
straight the essays are quite entertaining and display a zest and 
humor uncharacteristic of the Quarterly. Although the man in the 
moon sometimes calls himself a progressive,21 he obviously adheres 
to conservative positions. He is critical of trade unions, socialism, 
egalitarianism, egotistic individualism, and he favors capitalism, 
private property, enlightened colonialism, traditional concepts of 
society and the family. But although we are to take the persona 
seriously, we are not on that account to overlook its use of irony 
and deliberate exaggeration. Taylor'S attitude toward the socialists, 
internationalists, wobblies, and suffragettes is similar to that of 
Aristophanes, in The Clouds, toward Socrates, Sophists, the physical 
philosophers: it is a mixture of authentic disapproval and inten-
tional hyperbole. Like Aristophanes and that whole tribe of 
satirists, Taylor knew that outrageous assertion is one of the best 
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means of ridiculing and enraging an opposition deficient in humor 
but not in self-importance. In the political and economic nature of 
his subjects, as in the facetiousness of his style and tone, he is a 
refreshing complement to the other more philosophical and liter-
ary Nebraska humanists. 
2. Major Themes and 
Other Writers in the 
Mid-West Quarterly 
SECTION ONE: PHILOSOPHY, 
AESTHETICS, LITERARY CRITICISM 
T HE SIX SCHOLARS surveyed in Chapter 1 exerted the greatest 
influence on the tone and slant of the Quarterly, and they were the 
most noteworthy of the Nebraska humanists at that time. But to get 
a complete notion of the subjects and themes stressed in the jour-
nal, it is necessary to examine some intelligent articles by less pro-
lific Nebraskans and non-Nebraskans. 
E. Benjamin Andrews was sometime professor of philosophy, 
political science, homiletics, and history. As an educator and a con-
troversial chancellor of the University of Nebraska, he won a na-
tional reputation. But he had retired and was quite elderly when he 
wrote for the Quarterly, and his humanism strikes one, after reading 
Frye or Alexander, as somewhat unsophisticated. An article on 
Greek nationalism is representative of his thought. Had Greece-
instead of Rome-unified herself, he argues, and prevailed over 
the future of the West, we would now enjoy a civilization "domi-
nated by mind and not by brawn." This hypothesis is perhaps 
plausible, but hardly substantial enough to support such an elabo-
rate thesis as Andrews constructs. He ends, too, on a highly 
theoretical and optimistic note, urging us, surrounded as we are by 
"matter, crass, dull stuff," to "ram it full of mind" (p. 314). In "The 
Renaissance" there is a similar optimism. He disparages the 
medieval period as intellectually barren and devoid of genius: The 
Canterbury Tales is in the main "a simple reproduction of Boccaccio's 
Decameron"; Petrarch is more advanced than Dante in his 
humanism (pp. 141-42). In the Renaissance, he concludes, "all 
Western humanity ... started up to put away childish things. 
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Not in a day, not in a century, was the old-time narrowness, crudity, 
heathenism of religious thinking to pass away. Alas, it lingers still. 
The mills of God grind slowly. But every moment since the Renais-
sance it has felt and been realizing its doom" (pp. ISO, 155). 
Perhaps his most developed piece concerns "Art and Character," 
where he argues that art improves us morally (p. 240). The truth of 
the "moral theory of beauty," although not demonstrable 
mathematically, can be apprehended intuitively. The aesthetic 
sense is not altogether to be identified with the moral sense, but it is 
similar and should be cultivated. Appealing to Plato, he urges that 
our love of physical beauty should lead to love of spiritual beauty; 
but his discussion acquires a decidedly romantic and W ordsworth-
ian tone: there are "sermons in stones and brooks and flowers and 
hills, which we have no more right to ignore than we have to stop 
our ears before a prophet of God" (p. 246). He believes that coun-
try folk are on the whole morally superior to city folk because of 
their aesthetically preferable environment (p. 247), and though he 
admits that our civilization somewhat resembles that of Rome just 
before its fall, he ends, as in his other essays, hopefully: we have 
hardly yet begun to apply the "art power and the consequent moral 
power of our education," and if we begin to do this, we may hope 
for the best (p. 250). 
Andrews is clearly a humanist in his use of Greek culture and 
Platonism as a standard, and in his belief in the connection be-
tween ethics and aesthetics. Yet the greater sophistication of Frye 
or Gass, for example, in their analysis of the ethical elements in art 
is most apparent. Andrews's facile depreciation of the middle ages, 
his confidence in the future-these are attitudes quite uncharac-
teristic of neohumanism. Writing at the end of his life, Andrews 
could look back upon a career full of signal achievements, and his 
essays, sometimes pensive, sometimes optimistic, lack those acidul-
ous aspersions of materialism, modernism, and democracy so fre-
quent in Babbitt, More, and Frye. The essays have the idealism and 
eloquence of age, but are tinged or tainted by superficiality, senti-
mentality, and complacency. This mellowness, to characterize it 
generously, is very different from the brittle and strident style 
sometimes employed by the younger humanists; yet they were un-
derstandably more sensitive than he to those dislocations-whose 
preliminary tremors they had already detected-of the twentieth 
century. Of all the younger humanists, H. P. Alexander is most like 
him, though much more in touch with current thought; and it is 
only just to record that it was Andrews who as chancellor appointed 
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the outspoken Alexander to the Philosophy Department over the 
strong protestations of its chairman. 1 
There are no religious essays in the Quarterly, although two 
pieces by Hutton Webster, the first professor of anthropology at 
Nebraska, concern the philosophy of religion. In "Savage 
Spiritualism" Webster undertakes a very tolerant analysis of 
psychic phenomena in primitive societies; he is aware of the inves-
tigations of the Society for Psychical Research, and while he places 
weight on the psychological explanations of these phenomena, he 
leaves open the possibility of supernatural intervention. In "New-
man on the Development of Christian Doctrine" he traces the an-
tecedents of Newman's theory in Petarius, de Maistre, and so forth, 
and compares Newman's procedure in his sphere 'with that of Dar-
win and Spencer in theirs. On the whole, Webster is more conser-
vative than Newman, whose Essay on the Development of Christian 
Doctrine contains "from the point of orthodoxy ... dangerous con-
clusions." What most distresses him is that Newman's theories ex-
pose the Catholic church itself to the flux of sublunary life. What 
the Christian believes now may be but a phase, and the "impregna-
ble rock" of Christianity might years hence look very different. 
Hence Newman's own doctrine takes the first perilous step toward 
"rationalism and liberalism" (p. 25). Webster is the only Quarterly 
writer to take an overtly favorable view of orthodox Christianity, 
but his fundamental theme is philosophical and typically 
neohumanist: distrust of the flux. 2 
The essays on aesthetics and criticism show the influence, but not 
always the particular opinions, of Frye, Buck, and Gass. "Movie 
Democracy" by Lewis Worthington Smith (Drake) is representative. 
Smith attacks impressionism in poetry, since that school manifestly 
disdains human concerns and values. He laments a general disinte-
gration and "feminization" of the arts, and arraigns vers libre as a 
symptom of that process (pp. 337-39). He takes the motion pic-
tures as characteristic of modern art and its effect on life: "shifting, 
uncertain, aimless, indecisive, [modern art] presents a series of 
kaleidoscopic impressions passing over us as vainly as the shadow 
of the villain across the screen at the theatre. Slipping from movie 
to movie is an easy sort of self-indulgence, as any student of the city 
streets knows, and the impulses so engendered are certainly im-
pulses of disintegration" (p. 339). Romanticism and democracy 
cooperate, sometimes, in fortifying selfish, individual obsessions. 
Smith is not antidemocratic, but believes that in a democracy it is 
especially essential "that each man should search, not for anything 
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'through which he can most surely be himself,' but for that form of 
expression and that way of living that most happily relates him to 
his fellows" (p. 343). The values of the Anglo-Saxon culture, par-
ticularly its "active and constructive" insistence on personal liberty 
and the "higher faculties," are preeminently important in Ameri-
can society. These values should be reinforced by healthy art, lest 
we become "a conglomerate without homogeneity" (p. 345). 
The other Quarterly critics, various and lively, nevertheless share 
Smith's neohumanism. For example, Margaret Lynn (University of 
Kansas) deplores the narrowness and provincialism of our native 
literature by comparison with the European: its superficial op-
timism, lack of sophistication and a tragic sense of life. F. B. 
Kugelman attacks Shaw's relativistic humanism. Hardin Craig 
contends that the philosophies of a Carlyle or a Nietzsche are now 
superannuated: "It is no doubt a splendid thing to make one's way 
in the primeval forest with the bright efficiency of the timber wolf: 
but after all, our teeth are not equal to it, and we are subject to 
rheumatism" (p. 166). Robert Shafer, a staunch neohumanist later 
to be quite a force in the movement, regards both archaeology and 
naturalism as heirs of romanticism in their emphasis on the flux 
and the ephemeral. Like Samuel Johnson and the old humanist 
critics, he argues that great literature is "the expression of the thing 
that everybody has believed or felt." T. K. Whipple attacks spine-
less, impressionistic criticism and promotes Arnold as a model-
who, however, is now disparaged by moderns because he tried to 
"get definite results" in his criticism.3 
Although many of the essays are broadly theoretical, Bert Emsley 
(University of Wisconsin) shows in his "Poetry of William Vaughn 
Moody" how neohumanist principles can be applied to a specific 
figure. Regionalism has appealed to many American critics, but not 
to Emsley, for whom it is part of the flux. Consequently he does not 
censure Moody for his antiregionalism: indeed, "there could be 
little in the country home to hold a man of Moody's highly culti-
vated tastes" (p. 224). Moody's predecessors were Lowell and 
Longfellow, embodiments, like him, of transplanted European 
culture. Emsley admires these writers, but wistfully (and correctly) 
predicts that these poets will probably give way eventually in our 
schools to "native writers like Mark Twain and Whitman ... undis-
tinguished in style but genuinely American in inspiration." Gener-
ally, Emsley is suspicious of sentimentalism and prefers poems on 
universal themes. Like Louise Pound and Margaret Lynn, he is 
indifferent toward "nativists" like Whitman, but he recognizes that 
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he is probably on the losing side in aesthetics. In pedagogy, too, he 
prefers-but senses that it is a futile preference-the classical ideal. 
"And even in education the native school is already getting the lead 
by shifting the emphasis in liberal studies toward history, politics, 
sociology, and modern literature, as far away as possible from 'the 
glory that was Greece and the grandeur that was Rome' " (p. 229). 
In the main, then, the critics of the Quarterly are neohumanist in 
bent. The Emersons and Whitmans are not, they believe, what the 
twentieth-century American needs. Disposed as he is by nature 
toward lawlessness and provinciality, the modern American re-
quires the conservative balance found in the more mature Euro-
pean literature and its American transplants. More Arnolds, not 
more Whitmans, are to be desired. The Quarterly critics are firm in 
their defense of western, and specifically Anglo-Saxon, cultural 
values; and some of them foresee-but only to reject-the now 
fashionable praise of pluralism and the concomitant loathing of 
anything even remotely "chauvinistic." 
SECTION Two: EDUCATION 
Most of the essays on education show a familiar, neohumanist mis-
trust of centrifugal or fragmentary societies, but at the same time 
they are often bold in their criticism of fashionable methodologies 
and vocationalism. In "The Public School and the Painter," Horace 
M. Kallen (University of Wisconsin), occupying a position similar to 
Smith's "Movie Democracy," takes the motion picture as represen-
tative of modern life and art: it disintegrates "all the movements 
into a series of isolated and motionless fixtures, machine-made, 
and machine-controlled in reproduction" (p. 20). America espe-
cially lacks a central, inward character and integrity. Only in the 
public schools have we an instrument for forging true national 
identity, but we are on the verge of abandoning ourselves to a 
mindless and anarchistic vocationalism. The public school, allied 
with the artist, should foster Americanization and generate a set of 
symbols that will profoundly express "the Nation's common and 
constant mood and her central vision" (p. 25). Kallen is no crude 
advocate of melting-pot acculturalization-indeed, he is now re-
membered as one of its earliest opponents. And he strongly op-
poses simpleminded political propaganda in education and art. But 
like the other humanists, with the possible exception of Alexander, 
he is more fearful than enamored of pluralism. 
Major Themes and Other Writers / 29 
Like Buck and Gass, Alfred D. Sheffield, "College Study of En-
glish," recommends a fixed curriculum and a unifying "idea" for 
college education. To be sure, Sheffield concedes, one can educate 
oneself merely by reading magazines, but the distinction of college 
training lies in its producing order, coherence, and direction, a 
"winnowed experience" (p. 202). He also attacks "professors who 
emit personality directly through class-room sermonettes," and 
questions the value of "leisure and spontaneous reading as the 
really fruitful things in a college career" (p. 200). But Sheffield is 
no stodgy pedant. He censures survey and period courses as inef-
fective, at least on the lower levels, and he disapproves of an exces-
sive and sterile emphasis on mere facts. We should first offer 
courses in how to recognize and read literature, and those ends can 
be met only if we appeal to the students' own limited knowledge 
and work from there. Thus Sheffield gives qualified approval to 
what are now known as "relevance courses." Nevertheless, like 
other neohumanists, he is most concerned with the values and ideas 
in literature. Hence writers like Fielding, Dickens, Masefield, and 
H. G. Wells, although rewarding subjects for leisure reading, are 
too insubstantial to be accommodated by the formal curriculum. 
Perhaps the most unconventional article is "Personality and Edu-
cation" by H. K. Wolfe (University of Nebraska). Like Buck, Gass, 
and Kallen, Wolfe opposes rampant vocationalism and, defending 
education on humanist grounds, urges that it inculcate moral val-
ues. But unlike some of the humanists, he advocates considerable 
flexibility in education: "Difference instead of uniformity will be 
the aim of each teacher. The child will advance, not with his class, 
but according to health, strength, ability, and willingness" (p. 270). 
Wolfe admits that some restrictions on individual freedom are 
necessary "in our moral and social worlds," but these restrictions 
are not so requisite in our educational institutions. "The ideal of 
completest personal development requires that every impediment 
be removed from the life of the child, and that he be neither hin-
dered nor deformed by extraneous forces" (p. 271). Of course 
authority must be reverenced, but the value of obedience has been 
exaggerated in our pedagogy. The child should not be drilled in 
blind obedience, but rather be encouraged to develop self-control 
(p. 272). Wolfe, whom H. B. Alexander called in his obituary a 
Socratic, is hardly to be identified with the more radical modern 
educators; but his essay contrasts strikingly with, for example, 
Buck's "Puero Reverentia" (see chap. 1, Sec. 3). Wolfe was, for a 
variety of reasons, a controversial teacher,4 and it is appropriate 
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that Alexander should have executed his obituary for the Mid-West 
Quarterly. Like Alexander, Wolfe represents a distinctly more 
libertarian strain of humanism. 
Other essays touch variously on education. There is a defense of 
the professor who publishes (more information is always useful, no 
matter how trivial it may seem, and a published professor wins 
more admiration and authority in the classroom).5 The president 
of the board of regents argues that universities and colleges have a 
civilizing effect on societies, but should retain their aloofness and 
refrain from religious and political entanglements. 6 One essay ad-
vocates something like a code of professional ethics for teachers.7 A 
professor at Missouri recognizes and deplores those teachers who 
"are experiencing a sort of crise de conscience with respect to 
literature"-who are uncertain what to teach, or even what teach-
ing is. He thus anticipates, and condemns, a very modern syn-
drome. But, significantly, he puts in a good word for popular liter-
ature and contemporary, undergraduate interests: "the age and 
the student have their rights. Let us meet them half-way; ulti-
mately, we shall have to do even more than that."8 
One of the liveliest essays is Bert Emsley's on "Freshman English 
and Creative Teachers." There he recounts, with some intentional 
hyperbole, the burdens of a young instructor teaching freshman 
composition, an occupation which produces in him the decay of all 
idealism, creativity, and sense of style. Emsley urges that we adopt, 
not necessarily a new official program, but at least a more en-
lightened attitude which, less preoccupied with historical and 
philological subjects, would not condemn the young teacher to 
hurry off "his theme work in ten hours in order to devote two 
hours at night to counting syllables in a Middle English alliterative 
romance" (p. 310). Such harried teachers should, rather, be en-
couraged to read widely and to develop further their creative and 
cultural interests. 
I have deliberately used Bert Emsley to conclude the first two 
sections of this chapter. He is one of the better and wittier of the 
minor contributors. But more important, his two essays--the one 
on Moody, the other on freshman English-show a characteristic 
pattern in neohumanist thought. In his essay on literary criticism 
he emerges as a conservative classicist whose enthusiasm for the 
romantic, nativist American tradition is decidedly restrained. Yet in 
his article on education he is quite "progressive," questioning the 
value of the then regnant historical and philological biases and 
adopting an unorthodox view of how a young teacher should oc-
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cupy himself-in cultural self-development rather than dessicated 
scholarship. This union of classical literary tastes and unconven-
tional educational theory may seem odd, but one can observe it in 
the leaders of the neohumanist movement as well. Both Babbitt 
and More incurred the dislike of their fellow academicians as much 
for their censure of modish educational schemes as for their 
philosophical conservatism; both argued especially for fundamen-
tal changes in the graduate programs of American universities. 
Such viewpoints, conservative in one way and iconoclastic in 
another, are reflected in the Quarterly articles, Although the writers 
on education generally favor a central and unifying curriculum, 
they by no means espouse a rigid methodology. In several instances 
they advocate as much individualizing of education as possible 
without lapsing into total anarchy. They are tolerant of, and indeed 
support, some kinds of curricular reform. Emsley's two articles, 
then, exemplify a pattern found generally in neohumanism: a tra-
ditional or classical aesthetics infused by heterodox, or at least un-
conventional, pedagogical views. 
SECTION THREE: 
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY: 
JUSTICE, COLONIALISM, THE FIRST WORLD WAR 
There are two essays on justice, one by William Granger Hastings 
(University of Nebraska), the other by Roscoe Pound (Harvard).9 
Both are in the natural-law tradition of Edmund Burke. Hastings's 
is well written but conventional in its emphasis on consensus and 
prescription. Pound's is more venturesome and addresses a perva-
sive dissatisfaction with the efficiency and justness of American 
courts. He recognizes that there are some new problems which 
courts, established for the pioneer and agricultural communities of 
the early nineteenth century, cannot easily accommodate. Hence it 
is natural that today a "law-ridden people," finding the system too 
sluggish or even comatose, should construct alternative instru-
ments of justice: boards and commissions, juvenile courts, and so 
forth. This is a dangerous development, for jurisprudence may 
then yield to politics, the judge to the administrator, the court to 
the judicial referendum (p. 225). The solution is to endeavor, 
through good training in the law schools, to make judicial justice 
more responsive, for we cannot, finally, have justice without law: 
32 / The New Humanists in Nebraska 
"No form of conservation is more important than the conservation 
of social institutions. And no social institution is of more value than 
the legal tradition" (p. 233). Pound's argument, more intricate than 
a paraphrase can suggest, is distinctly Burkean. He is opposed to 
unprofessional, impressionistic interpretations of the law, but also 
to a rigid and rationalistic set of rules claiming universality and 
produced "by purely logical processes" (p. 230). He favors a flexi-
ble, organic, natural-law tradition, responsive to changing times 
but ensuring security and continuity.lo 
The question of colonialism and subjugated peoples is taken up 
by two writers. J. E. Miller's "The English in Egypt" concedes that 
because the world war has exposed the evils of race rivalry and 
intolerance "our instinctive prejudice against the control of one 
people by another has been very greatly deepened" (p. 332). Still, 
not all people in the world should necessarily be given the right to 
govern themselves. Besides, who has a right to govern Egypt? The 
Turks? The Greeks? The Egyptian people, through history, have 
never shown a great aptitude for self-rule. The English are not 
altogether altruistic, but they are demonstrably more enlightened 
and humane in their colonial supervision than the other potential 
overseers (pp. 332-33). 
In "Race Contact and Mixture in Colonies" Minnie Throop En-
gland (University of Nebraska) speaks unhesitatingly of "inferior 
races," and though she opposes prejudice, she recognizes a rooted 
antipathy between the races, especially those that differ in striking, 
physical ways. Despite a terminology that is now unfashionable, 
England's analysis of race relations is quite equitable and rea-
sonably objective. Some would consider her a racist in her belief 
that primitive peoples are often stimulated by contact with superior 
ones and that "the Negro, with his inherited tribal instinct and 
longing for a chief or leader, has always submitted to the supre-
macy of the white man as a natural state of affairs, and prospers" 
(p. 171). In addition, she disapproves of race mixtures and argues 
that even slavery had its advantages for the subjected class.ll At the 
same time, however, she attacks "the degraded communism of In-
dian reservation life" and urges that educated Indians "be mingled 
as common citizens of the Republic" (p. 176). She opposes exploi-
tation, and closes on a "progressive" note: continuing studies in 
environmentalism may show "in time that races potentially are 
more nearly equal than is generally believed. The capabilities of the 
inferior peoples have rarely if ever been given a fair test." Both 
Miller and England are pragmatic, largely unideological defenders 
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of colonialism as facilitating stability and justice. Both, like other 
neohumanists, see no reason to question the excellence of their 
own civilization and culture. 
The articles on the war fall into two phases: those in the first 
phase analyze the various historical, economic, and diplomatic 
causes; the later ones debate America's role in the conflict and, 
more specifically, the relative merits of belligerency and pacifism. 
The April 1915 Quarterly was given over almost entirely to the war, 
but since America was then neutral, the essays represent chiefly the 
first phase. 
The lead article is "The Diplomatic Background of the European 
War" by Bernadotte E. Schmitt (Western Reserve University). This 
is a sober dissection of the preliminary events, laying stress on 
economics as well as diplomacy. Schmitt cannot be pronounced 
altogether neutral: she reproaches German officials for being in-
flexible and unconciliatory (pp. 213-16). But she is signally impar-
tial on the point of expansionism, contending that at one point or 
another all the powers have "been arrogant and unscrupulous, and 
to this extent all are equally responsible for the war" (p. 217). It is 
true that Germany has not had the same opportunity as some other 
nations to expand, and we must admit that "Deutschland fiber Alles 
[is] as reasonable a slogan as Britannia Rules thl' Waves"; neverthe-
less, this misfortune of Germany's cannot excuse or even extenuate 
unjust aggression (pp. 218--19). Another important cause of the 
war, though, was the growth of the German navy, worrisome to 
England because of her dependency on the sea. Schmitt also chas-
tises the incendiary press of both Germany and England, which 
made "the negotiation of an agreement, or at least a detente, unusu-
ally difficult, if not impossible" (p. 222). We must agree that Eng-
land is in the right, Schmitt decides, but she concludes on another 
tack, asserting that far from being antiquated, war is now more 
ubiquitous than ever. Modern democracies have shown themselves 
to be conspicuously chauvinistic; and, moreover, "one cannot help 
feeling that behind the mazes of diplomacy and the ambitions of 
nations, there has long existed on the part of governments and 
peoples alike ... a subconscious desire to make use of the colossal 
armaments accumulated during the last generation" (p. 229). 
The next essay, "Colonial Aspects of the War" by Cephas D. Allin 
(University of Minnesota), is equally moderate. He allows that En-
glish colonialism is highly enlightened, but also praises Germany: 
"She has accomplished in the higher realm of thought and feeling 
what England has in the lower world of politics-a true master of 
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the souls of men" (p.236). But Germany is young as a nation, and 
emerged out of "autocracy, not of democracy; of blood and iron, 
not of constitutional agitation" (p.237). On top of this, she "has 
inherited the splendid ideals of Roman culture and organization, 
of the supreme but beneficent rule of a superior race. In this impe-
rial conception there is no room for a competing civilization" 
(p.237). This view naturally collides with English notions of indi-
vidual and national liberty. Allin sympathizes, like Schmitt, with 
Germany's desire for colonies, and censures the Monroe Doctrine 
for intercepting her logical expansion in South America. But he 
cannot condone her militarism, and he believes that the colonial 
allies of England are defending, not merely the British Empire, but 
"the constitutional principles of national liberty on which that em-
pire is based" (p. 248). 
"German versus English Aggression," by A. D. Schrag (University 
of Nebraska), is of all the essays the most sympathetic toward Ger-
many. He urges that we examine the present situation historically 
and objectively. If we do this, we shall see that England over the 
years has been as aggressive as Germany-indeed, she has been 
more so. Hence aggressiveness should not be viewed as a German 
racial trait. He then dilates on the controversies surrounding 
Schleswig-Holstein and Alsace-Lorraine with a view to exculpating 
Germany. Like Schmitt and Allin, he argues that, because of his-
torical circumstances, Germany has been defrauded of a natural 
colonialism, and that she subsequently took only what had been 
discarded or disdained by others (p. 261). England is chiefly in-
terested, not in a balance of power, but in her own supremacy, and 
to maintain this supremacy she has resorted to high-handedness 
and deceit; consequently, her attacks on Germany's morality are 
hypocritical. In fact, most people in England and America asperse 
Germany for her alleged philosophy-in other words, for her doc-
trine of life. "Germany is condemned to-day not for what she has 
done or is doing, but for what people consider to be her intentions. 
Germany, accordingly, finds herself in the position of the heretic in 
the Middle Ages, who was persecuted not for his immoral deeds 
but for his distasteful ideas" (p. 263). 
A short piece by Sherlock Bronson Gass concludes this issue of 
the Quarterly. In "The Ideal of Peace" he calls for calm, lucid 
thought and an understanding of Germany's position. Why do we 
praise the French for preserving her treaties with Russia, but con-
demn Germany for keeping them with Austria? Why do we praise 
the efficiency of our activities but condemn that of the German 
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army? Why do we not recognize that "Germany is the only one of 
the fighting nations that since her formation in 1871 has not made 
aggressions" (p. 290)? Moreover, though we claim to be peace lov-
ers, yet our history shows we are not in principle against war. We 
have always been willing to violate the "ideal of peace" in order to 
make "our ideas of right prevail by force of arms." Life is not 
"nice." Until human nature shall alter itself, there will always be 
occasions when two peoples, genuinely committed to causes, are 
prepared to fight for them. At such times, at least, there can only be 
the ultimate arbiter of war (pp. 292-93). If we hope Germany is 
defeated because we happen to admire France or England as 
superior civilizations, we are conceivably rational, though perhaps 
unfair. But to hope for the defeat of Germany because this will 
produce universal peace is naive and fallacious. Universal and 
permanent peace presupposes a world in which all nations think 
alike, and that is a mere chimera. We can work for relative peace 
only when we recognize that "in the presence of diverse knowledge 
and diverse thinking, war is humanly inevitable." And once we 
recognize that, the "first result ... would be to give the German 
cause a fairer consideration than it has yet received at our door" 
(pp. 294-95).12 
Gass's discussion of pacifism introduces the second phase of the 
controversy. His colleague P. M. Buck's "Pacifism and Ideas" (found 
in "Screenings [No.2]") may well be the most sensitive contribution 
to that debate. Buck identifies an idealistic pacifism which, however 
contradicted on every page of history, has at least a quixotic beauty 
and appeal. But there is another, repulsive kind, an "economic 
pacifism" which fastens on the economic cause of war as the only 
cause. This pacifism is as unrealistic as the first, and much more 
ignoble. Were economic factors indeed the sole or even chief cause 
of war, such pacifism would carry weight. But in fact people go to 
war because they see that ideas are involved, and, as creatures with a 
moral sense, they believe that it is important which ideas prevail. 
Economic pacifism is a manifestation of that cynical materialism 
which has "sunk deep roots into our whole theory oflife and civiliza-
tion" (p. 373). Modern educational theories emphasize making 
people economically efficient, and this "trade school ideal" has crept 
into even our best universities and contributed to the appeal of 
economic pacifism (p. 373). This species is most vigorous in the 
Middle West, where we contemplate complacently our growing af-
fluence and are insulated by geography from the rigors of the 
conflict. Economic pacifism deplores the waste of wealth and life 
entailed by war; but waste is a law of nature: 
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For every oak tree there are a myriad of unfruitful acorns and a forest of blighted 
saplings .... And what a terrifyingly uneconomic thing a mere courtship is with its 
thousands of useless presents, its wasted sighs, and its perfunctory wedding fees .... 
those who value our civilization only for its material benefits and social comities, 
have at least one thing to learn ... that even the most transient of these are things to 
gain which even the most pacific of men must sometimes risk even their lives. (P. 
376). 13 
The most indefatigable writer on this subject was Charles 
Kuhlman, who produced three sometimes intemperate, sometimes 
acute articles in which he denominates war a "great historic institu-
tion" and enumerates its virtues. War has discouraged alcoholism, 
especially in Russia, and has stimulated inventions; it does not 
cause the races to degenerate, but quite the reverse; it often brings 
about social and political readjustments necessary "to give freer 
play to the creative forces" of man; it can advance civilization, as we 
see in the conquests of ancient Rome. Kuhlman sometimes lapses 
into the ridiculous, as when he argues that the war "is not produc-
ing hatreds .... [it] is creating mutual understanding and respect 
as each [enemy] discovers unsuspected virtues in his antagonist." 
Yet he shows sense in denying that this war will end all wars; there 
will always be new soldiers and new antagonisms. And there is 
much to be said for his view that the only alternative to war may be 
a federal police force that would rule by might or whim rather than 
by justice, and under which freedom of local institutions and the 
right of self-government might be suppressed or inexorably decay. 
He remarks that it is naive to believe republican states are ipso facto 
more pacific than monarchical ones. And with respect to Christian 
idealism, he develops intelligently the distinction between the per-
sonal morality of the Sermon on the Mount and that practical mor-
ality which must be exercised in the outer world of compromises 
and conflicting interests. 14 
Only Francis T. Philbrick (University of California), in "Rational 
Bases for Ultimate International Peace," advances a moderate 
pacifist line. He believes that "democracy and liberalism" are 
rapidly unifying the world, and that pacifism is implicit in 
liberalism. There is much nobility in nationalism, he concedes, and 
national cultures are richer than any international one might be. 
Hence he agrees with conservatives on one point: doctrinaire 
pacifists are misguided in desiring to eradicate all national cultures. 
But the aggressive aspects of nationalism must be repressed. We 
must establish some sort of international league and educate men 
to sacrifice themselves for the commonweal rather than the nation, 
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and to have a will to change the social order rather than meekly to 
acquiesce in it. 15 
These political essays, at first glance, may seem to express ideas 
now in academic disfavor. Apologies for colonialism and war are 
not welcomed at present in the professional journals. Yet on 
further consideration they seem quite objective in the best scholarly 
tradition. True, only one substantial essay supports pacifism, but 
none of the articles, not even Kuhlman's, is conspicuously belliger-
ent or incendiary. Indeed, the essays preponderate toward toler-
ance, calmness, equity, and include much admiration of German 
culture and sympathy for her historic situation. There is no jin-
goism here, and no inconsequent optimism about the inherent 
peacefulness of democracies. The University of Nebraska, like 
many similar institutions during the Great War, was widely sus-
pected by the general public of disloyalty. With that in mind, the 
tone of these essays is especially noteworthy. Certainly they are far 
removed from the strong anti-German sentiment apparently rife at 
American universities even during the period of neutrality.I6 At 
least two reasons may account for this moderation. In 1915-16 the 
Middle West was notably less keen than the East to enter the war, 
owing to its remoter location and ethnic composition. In addition, 
the neohumanists, though in one way more extreme than moderate 
conservatives of the time, were also less naive and optimistic, and so 
less subject to fads and fanaticisms. It was precisely the moderate 
conservatives who were apt to become, by 1917, the super patriots; 
and no one more angrily denounced the pacifists than John 
Dewey.I7 
On pacifism, then, as on the plight of Germany, the essays are 
evenhanded enough. Those by Gass and Buck best express the 
neohumanist view that pacifism is unrealistic in light of human 
nature; that, being unrealistic, it is not effective; that much 
pacifism derives from the superordination of individual life over 
ethical imperatives; and that even man's most hideous actions find 
their source, not in economics or biology, but in morality and 
idealism. 
Conclusion 
SELF-DISCIPLINE AND THE AFFIRMATION of a moral order: these are 
probably the most fundamental imperatives of neohumanism. 
"Civilization, at bottom, rests on the recognition of the fact that 
man shows his true liberty by resisting impulse, and not by yielding 
to it, that he grows in the perfection proper to his own nature not 
by throwing off but by taking on limitations."1 This belief is pro-
moted by all the major contributors to the Quarterly. It is seen in 
their distinction between the restraining classical and the expansive 
romantic sensibility, in their commitment to the higher reality (the 
One) over the sublunary flux (the Many) and to the superiority of a 
disciplined, liberal-arts education over vocationalism. It is seen also 
in their concern for ethical norms in the arts and for self-sacrifice 
in war. Of course there are disagreements. Alexander questions 
Frye's classic-romantic dichotomy; Wolfe favors more indi-
vidualism in education than Buck or Gass; Taylor promotes 
capitalism and colonialism more explicitly than the others. But the 
philosophical orientation of Quarterly must be plain by now; like 
that of neohumanism in general it is at odds with the prevailing 
tendencies of twentieth-century thought. 
In an elaborate memorandum to Chancellor Avery, H. B. Alex-
ander once suggested a variety of university reforms. Heading the 
list of proposed "scholarly enterprises" was: 
An interpretation of English culture. We have heard much of German "Kultur" in 
the past years, and have actuaJly, in our schools, known more of it than of the 
Anglo-American tradition. There is no reason why Nebraska should not be a leader 
among American universities in so interpreting English history, law, literature, and 
the native American expansions of these, that our work should be everywhere 
recognized .... Once begun the work could make the Mid-West Quarterly its organ, 
and give the whole middle west a tone of distinction which it lacks! 
This memorandum is undated, but it was probably prepared in the 
summer of 1920. If so, the document tells us several useful things. 
It suggests that the final number of the Quarterly, dated 1918 but 
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actually published in 1919 (see Introduction), was not viewed at the 
time as its last. The memorandum also shows that Alexander, one 
of the journal's associate editors, had special plans for it. How the 
Quarterly should have become an organ for interpreting the 
"Anglo-American tradition" Alexander never explains. But one 
guesses, in view of his other writings, that he might have made it 
less exclusively neohumanist. Under his direction it might have 
addressed, with less argumentative flourish, the "native American' 
expansions" of English traditions; and at the same time it might 
well have become more regional in its focus (it is to "give the whole 
middle west a tone of distinction"). As a classicist and Platonist, Frye 
had resisted such regionalization, but Alexander was a rather dif-
ferent sort of humanist from Frye. 
Because the Quarterly did not survive, these are of course mere 
conjectures, and they are not advanced with any great confidence. 
After all, Alexander did believe in humanism, despite his dis-
agreements with the Babbitt-More version. If his memorandum is 
any sign, he would have featured the affiliations and ligatures be-
tween British and American traditions, however different the 
minor emphases might have been. Thus his intentions for the 
Quarterly might not have altered drastically its actual course. The 
major contributors, as I have noted, had been educated in the 
eastern regions of the country, often at Harvard, or, like Alexander 
and Louise Pound, were Lincolnites who had done graduate work 
in the East or abroad. There is clear evidence in their articles that 
they considered it important to support and consolidate the supre-
macy of Anglo-American values in the plains. One might note, too, 
that Alexander employs the phrase "native American" in its then 
common acceptation: it refers to Anglo-Americanism. In the re-
mark of another Nebraska humanist nearly sixty years later, the 
phrase itself has acquired a very different meaning, and the view-
point, too, contrasts with Alexander's: "For Nebraskans, the past 
which is ours is that of the great Native American [that is, Indian] 
civilizations of the Plains, and of the transformed Mexican, Black, 
Scandinavian, Slavic, German, and Irish folk cultures whose self-
consciousness was formed in the nineteenth century liberal revolu-
tions."3 Alexander was one of the first humanists to examine sym-
pathetically the cultures of the American Indians; and as has been 
noted, he prized the variety and individuality of the unassimilated 
ethnic groups. But as a humanist he valued above these the greater 
universality, in some cases the greater sophistication, of the 
Anglo-American tradition. Even for Nebraskans, he seems to be 
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saying, it is that civilization which is quintessentially theirs, and that 
to seek stability in peripheral or decayed cultures is not conser-
vatism but nostalgia. 
Of course one can also feel nostalgia toward that "genteel tradi-
tion" for which, unsympathetic critics might say, Alexander wished 
to make the Quarterly an organ. As George Santayana was even then 
arguing, this genteel tradition was already "at bay." In his view, 
nineteenth-century humanism had terminated in an arid agnosti-
cism and idolatry of culture. The neohumanists of the early twen-
tieth century, he rightly believed, reacted against this conclusion, a 
conclusion no less lame and impotent for all the eloquence and 
repute of Matthew Arnold. Santayana concurs with the newer 
humanists that "the gist of modern history would seem to be this: a 
many sided insurrection of the unregenerate natural man, with all 
his physical powers and affinities, against the regimen of Christen-
dom."4 But he contends that if the American neohumanists wish to 
assert an absolute criterion of taste and morals against the flux and 
chaos of modernity, they must embrace supernaturalism. They 
should turn, in fact, to that form of su pernaturalism most readily 
accessible to modern man: Christian Platonism, which recognizes a 
supernatural order but preserves a humanistic orientation. 5 San-
tayana's diagnosis seems sound enough, however doubtful his pre-
scription. He has clearly identified the central dilemma, possibly 
the paradox, of neohumanism: it would eschew cramping, 
theological dogmatism (hence remaining true to the humanist 
ideal), yet at the same time construct absolute moral criteria and 
standards of self-discipline against the corrosive relativism and 
permissiveness of our age. Babbitt, to be sure, explicitly opposes 
the thesis of Santayana's Genteel Tradition at Bay, asserting that one 
may center on man, dispense with theological absolutism, and still 
preserve firm standards. 6 But the animadversions of Santayana·, 
and the like strictures of T. S. Eliot, have retained their force. 7 
Of course I would urge that the neohumanists were offering 
more than Santayana's dessicated genteel tradition. Their tough-
ness of thought enabled them to survive the collapse of Victorian 
conservatism after 1912, as Henry F. May has noted. They were at 
their strongest, indeed, in the twenties and early thirties, though P. 
E. More indicates in his letters to Frye that they were even then an 
embattled minority. Their great weakness lay not in an effete gen-
tility, but in their reluctance or inability to ground their arguments 
in a coherent religious or metaphysical scheme. By the Second 
World War neohumanism had spent itself. Those that continued 
Conclusion / 41 
its assaults on relativism, materialism, and naturalism often wrote 
from a religious perspective: T. S. Eliot, C. S. Lewis, Eric Voegelin, 
Reinhold Niebuhr, Malcolm Muggeridge, and others. The Quar-
terly betrays this weakness, for it contains no significant articles on 
religion or theology. The foremost theoreticians among the Ne-
braska humanists are Frye and Alexander. Frye draws his 
metaphysics chiefly from Plato, ignoring even that Christian 
Platonism recommended by Santayana. Alexander is still less satis-
factory. Actively hostile to any particular metaphysics, he advocates 
a humanism consisting of a diverse and often contradictory con-
geries of thinkers. 
The new humanists, it must be admitted, shunned deliberately 
any distinct, philosophical scheme. They wished to meet the twen-
tieth century head-on, and most of them believed that an overt 
appeal to Christian or any other traditional metaphysics was ill 
advised; it would represent a "retreat to the past." After the defal-
cation from Christianity of the eighteenth-century "Enlighten-
ment" philosophers, after the naturalist-romantic triumph in the 
nineteenth century, modern man (they felt) could never find solace 
in a dogmatic and traditional faith. But in aiming at a true catholi-
cism, the neohumanists seem to have failed, perhaps for being too 
abstract and rationalistic. Whether there will be an enduring revival 
of orthodox Christianity no one can say. But it is clear that the 
vacuum left by an active and historic faith has been occupied, not 
by humanism, but by varieties of two rampant dispositions. There 
are on the one hand secularized religions like Marxism, radical 
psychoanalysis, transcendental meditation; there are on the other 
peculiar religious or quasi-religious sects: the charismatic move-
ments, occultism, Gnosticism, and so forth. None of these satisfies 
the universalist aims of neohumanism, and a number of them 
promulgate the opposite of Babbitt's ideals of civilization, preach-
ing emancipation rather than restraint, alleged self-fulfillment in-
stead of self-denial, the vagaries of emotionalism in place of the 
enduring certitudes of classicism. 
Long before its excesses were apparent, Goethe termed romanti-
cism a disease. The neohumanists of course agreed with this, but 
their own view of romanticism has now been denounced a carica-
ture, while at the same time their detested romantics have been 
rehabilitated as authentic conservatives. s Other neohumanist prin-
ciples, whether in the areas of philosophy, criticism, education, 
politics, have been greatly aspersed. The aesthetics of the Quarterly 
writers must seem ludicrously antiquated in an academic world 
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presided over by the Northrop, not the Prosser Hall, Fryes. 9 The 
new humanism was moribund by 1940; the Quarterly lasted but five 
years; the names of the Nebraska humanists are known only to the 
specialist. This movement, surely, cannot claim exorbitant impor-
tance. But at the same time the impartial observer might recognize 
signs of a reaction against allegedly value-free formalist criticism 
and of a new emphasis on the "human" or ethical aspects of art. He 
may also conclude that the neohumanists were properly alarmed at 
the destabilizing tendencies of relativism and subjectivism, irres-
pective of whether they were right in tracing the sources of these to 
the romantics. 
In the end, the intellectual battles of the twentieth century are 
but a part of a much broader and inexorable conflict between natu-
ralism or secularism, and faith in a transcendental or supernatural 
world. What is more, in any age Santayana's "unregenerate natural 
man" is always threatening, and the "genteel tradition"-let us de-
fine it, departing from Santayana, as the tradition of civilization, 
self-restraint, recognition of a higher law-is always at bay. Viewed 
thus, the Quarterly may seem a momentary diversion in a minor 
skirmish; but its resolute and fastidious editor might have found in 
these lines a satisfactory epitaph for his journal: 
There is only the fight to recover what has been lost 
And found and lost again and again: and now, under conditions 
That seem unpropitious. But perhaps neither gain nor loss. 
For us, there is only the trying. The rest is not our business. IO 
Notes 
INTRODUCTION 
I. See Arthur Hazard Dakin, Paul Elmer More (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1960), p. 72 and passim. 
2. Quoted in ibid., p. 208. 
3. Quoted in ibid., pp. 191-92. 
4. See: H. B. Alexander quoted in Volta Torrey, "Familiar Campus Person-
ages," Nebraska Alumnus, October 1925, p. 338; WPA, Nebraska: A Guide to the Corn-
husker State (New York: Viking, 1939), p. 137 (this work also cites the Quarterly as one 
of Frye's major accomplishments); Lowry Wimberly quoted in Rudolph Umland, 
"Lowry Wimberly and Others: Reflections of a Beerdrinker," Prairie Schooner 51 
(1977): 33. 
5. See: J. David Hoeveler, Jr., The New Humanism: A Critique of Modern America, 
1900-1940 (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1977); on More, Dakin, 
More, and Francis X. Duggan, Paul Elmer More (New York: Twayne, 1966); on 
Babbitt, George A. Panichas, "The Critical Mission of Irving Babbitt," Modern Age 20 
(1976): 242-53. One should also consult the neohumanist "manifesto": Norman 
Foerster, ed., Humanism and America: Essays on the Outlook of Modern Civilisation (1930; 
reprint ed., Port Washington, N.Y.: Kennikat Press, 1967); and, for a concise state-
ment of the central ideas of the movement, Norman Foerster, American Criticism 
(1928; reprint ed., New York: Russell and Russell, 1962), chap. 5. 
6. Henry F. May, The End of American Innocence: A Study of the First Years of Our 
Own Time, 1912-1917 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1959), p. 353. 
7. Nebraska Alumnus, December 1933, p. 3. See also the introduction by Gass, 
Kenneth Forward, and Clarence Allen Forbes, to Frye's posthumous Plato, Univer-
sity Studies, O.S., Vol. 38, nos. 1-2 (Lincoln: Published by the University, 1938), p. v. 
8. University of Nebraska Archives, Board of Regents Papers, box 24, folder 
179. 
9. University Archives, Board of Regents Papers, box 24, folder 181. 
10. See the Daily Nebraskan, 14 November 1913, p. 6. 
II. Daily Nebraskan, 15 January 1914, p. 2. 
12. Louise Pound, ed., The Semi-Centennial Anniversary Book: The University of Ne-
braska, 1869-1919 (Lincoln, 1919), p. 91. See also University Journal, December 1913, 
p. 48: "It has received much favorable criticism and will no doubt fill an important 
place, not limited to the middle west." 
13. The Quarterly is mentioned routinely among the expense items in the Biennial 
Reports of the Board of Regents for 1915 and 1917; it does not appear in the 
Regents' agenda as an item of controversy. 
14. Of all the contributors, thirty-six have been definitely identified as University 
of Nebraska faculty, ex-faculty, or Lincolnites; fifty have no apparent connection 
43 
44 / Notes 
with the university or the state, although some may have been students or residents 
at one time. Most of the contributors have some academic affiliation. 
15. University Archives, Board of Regents Papers, box 26, folder 193. 
16. University Journal, October 1918, p. 19, and October 1919, p. 7. 
17. Even as early as 1926 it is overlooked in a catalog of The Learned and Scirntific 
Publicatiuns of the University of Nebraska (1871-1926), ed. Jacob Henry Gable (Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska, 1926); yet the same publication provides complete infor-
mation on, for example, the University Studies series. The "Bio-Bibliographies" pre-
pared by the University Reference Department in the 1930s for the Archives files on 
faculty members routinely omit mention of even substantial articles contributed to 
the Quarterly (see, e.g., the bibliographies prepared for H. B. Alexander and E. 
Benjamin Andrews). 
18. The phrase "golden years" is Robert N. Manley'S. See his Centennial History of 
the University of Nebraska, vol. 1, Frontier University (1869-1919) (Lincoln: University 
of Nebraska Press, 1969), pp. 147-48. 
CHAPTER 1 
1. R. D. Stock, "Prosser Hall Frye: Conservative Humanist," Modan Age 19 
(1975): 61-70. 
2. See the introduction to his Plato, p. v. 
3. Manuscript recollection of Gass by Kenneth Forward, University of Nebraska 
Archives file on Gass. 
4. Gass later dedicated one of his critical books, The Lover of the Chair (1919) to 
Frye, and another, The Criers of the Shops (1925) to Alexander. It will be more 
appropriate to discuss in Chap. 2, Sec. 3, Gass's two essays on pacifism. Aesthetics 
and pedagogy, his chief concerns, are examined here. 
5. For a later, fictional embodiment of this type of scientist, see the character 
Mark Studdock in That Hideous Strength (1945) by C. S. Lewis. Lewis's attitude to-
ward naturalism and scientism, best expressed in The Abolition of Man (1943), closely 
resembles that of the neohumanists. 
6. This essay was later incorporated into chap. 7 of his Criers of the Shops. 
7. This essay significantly anticipates Lionel Trilling's critique of liberalism in 
The Liberal Imagination (1950). The dialogue "A Modern Paradox" touches on mat-
ters to be developed by Ortega y Gasset in his well-known Revolt of the Masses (1930). 
8. Buck's Literary Criticism: A Study of Values in Literature (New York and London: 
Harper Brothers, 1930) and his ambitious literary survey, The Golden Thread (New 
York: Macmillan, 1931), are well written but finally quite elementary. The essays in 
the Quarterly have a crispness in both style and thought curiously diminished in his 
"major" works. As with Gass, I shall consider an essay of Buck's on pacifism in Chap. 
2, Sec. 3. 
9. From a similar vantage, Samuel Johnson had praised Shakespeare's charac-
ters as being species, not individuals (i.e., eccentrics experiencing odd or abnormal 
emotions) (Preface to Shakespeare). This is a continuous line of argument in humanist 
critics: see, e.g., Duncan Williams's Trousered Apes (New Rochelle, N.Y.; Arlington 
House, 1972). 
10. His iconoclasm is seen, too, in a little essay on "The Hunting of the Dean" (in 
"Screenings [No. 1]") where he vehemently depreciates the importance of the 
university-administrator class, urging that good professors be rewarded equally with 
deans. He laments that ambitious professors now aspire to advance, not through 
Notes / 45 
scholarship but bureaucratic expertise, so that they may at length achieve the crown 
of a deanship. Buck himself achieved this crown in 1919. 
I I. For a concise account of Alexander's multifarious achievements, see In 
Memoriam Hartley Burr Alexandtr, 1873-1939 (Claremont, Calif.: Scripps College 
Bulletin, Memorial Number, 1940). 
12. Cf. Samuel Johnson's famous remark: "We are perpetually moralists, but we 
are geometricians only by chance." 
13. Alexander's discussion of the Mormon Temple strongly resembles Edmund 
Burke's observation about the false sublime in architecture: "Designs that are vast 
only bv their dimensions are always the sign of a common and low imagination" (On 
the Sublime and Beautiful, pt. 2, sec. 10). By the same reasoning, Alexander argues in 
God and Man's Destiny (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1936) that fine architecture 
(e.g., the ;\Iebraska State Capitol) symbolizes man's noblest aspirations. 
14. See R. D. Stock, Samuel johnson and Neoclassical Dramatic Theory (Lincoln: 
Gniversity of Nebraska Press, 1973), pp. 110--16, 122-24. 
15. See his essay, "Art and Democracy," in the Scripps College Bulletin, cited 
above, n. II. A distrust of Bergson was shared by such otherwise dissimilar 
humanists as Babbitt and Julien Benda; hence the defense of Bergson by Alexander 
points to a significantly different philosophical bias. 
16. At a time (19 IS) when there was widespread criticism of allegedly disloyal or 
unpatriotic comments by university professors, Alexander made a spirited defense 
of freedom of speech and the importance of professors participating in civic affairs 
(see Manley, University of Nebraska, pp. 225-26). He was no dogmatic libertarian, 
however, for he also deplored the decadence of students' values, as detected in their 
use of profanity at football games, and their publishing lewd and salacious material 
in the 1912 Corn husker yearbook. Like Buck, he lamented the decline of the arts 
college and the growing impersonality and ethical neutrality of the university 
(Manley, University of Nebraska, p. 272). 
17. This is characteristic of the neohumanists: both Babbitt and Frye, for exam-
ple, ridiculed the Anglo-Saxon cultists that placed Beowulf on the level of the Iliad. 
IS. E.g., at the end of "New-World Analogues" she dismisses briefly the theory of 
the "multi-handed composition of the Homeric poems" as mystical and romantic; 
the consensus of later scholars su pports this view. 
19. See his Quarterly essay, "Spiritualism, Pacifism, Socialism," p. II. 
20. See Manley, University afNebraska, pp. 214, 221,222. 
21. See the "Suffragette" dialogue, pp. 157-5S. 
CHAPTER 2 
I. See Manley, University of Nebraska, p. 170. 
2. It is appropriate to mention here one other philosophical approach to the 
problem of the flux: Horace M. Kallen's "Pragmatic Interpretation of the History of 
Philosophy." If one may be permitted an apparent oxymoron, Kallen is a positivist 
neohumanist. He is as concerned as the other neohumanists with "the ultimate 
victory of man over the flux," but contemning the superstitions of the ancient 
Greeks and primitive Christians, he argues we can only achieve this victory through 
modern science, which has truly enabled us to control the flux (p. S7). 
3. Louise Pound, it has been noted, and other neohumanists appealed to Ar-
nold's example as a critic. See also, in the Quarterly, the article by Edward A. 
Thurber (p. 248-49); and cf. G. R. MacMinn, who considers Babbitt an important 
46 / Notes 
modern critic trying to establish rational bases of criticism ("Criticism and the Comic 
Spirit," p. 9&--97). 
4. See Manley, University of Nebraska, pp. 119, 120, 214, 217, 223, 224. 
5. Alvin S. Johnson (Cornell), "In Defense of the Professor who Publishes." 
6. Charles Sumner Allen, "The Over-Social Function of the State University." 
7. Edgar L. Hinman (Nebraska), "Professorial Ethics." 
8. J. Warshaw, 'The Aesthetic Fallacy in Literary Appreciation" p. 362. 
9. Hastings, "Justice"; Pound, "Justice According to Law." 
10. Burke's influence is not much felt in the neohumanists of the early part of the 
century, but he becomes very important for their successors, scholars and political 
theorists like Michael Oakeshott and Peter J. Stanlis. Pound significantly anticipates 
their viewpoints. 
11. England's remarks on the advantages of slavery, unpalatable as they will seem 
to many, have been partly supported by such recent studies as Time on the Cross, by 
R. W. Fogel and Stanley L. Engerman (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1974). 
12. Of all the contributors to the April volume, only Charles Sumner Allen 
(president of the Board of Regents, University of Nebraska) condemns Germany 
unequivocally ("Some Legal Aspects of the Invasion of Belgium," p. 288); and even 
he is no saber rattler, admitting in a later essay that "it was an altruistic aim that 
prompted the sinking of the Lusitania" ("The Rationalization of Methods of Con-
troversy," p. 348). One other essay in the volume, however, is uncritically patriotic: 
J. E. Le Rossignol's "Canada and the War." Finally, a later article by Gass develops 
further some of the ideas introduced in his first one: pacifism does not work, does 
not in fact lead to peace, and is itself a species of decadence, for "to commit oneself 
to the hope for permanent peace is to belittle the importance of moral ideas them-
selves" ("Tolstoi and the Doctrine of Peace," p. 15). 
13. W. G. Langworthy Taylor, "Spiritualism, Pacifism, Socialism," agrees that 
pacifists are idealists, but is severer on them than Buck: they are Quixotes that drag 
the rest of us down to destruction. 
14. See Kuhlman's three essays passim (listed in the Index to the Quarterly). On 
the Sermon on the Mount and practical morality, cf. a more recent but similar 
analysis by Eric Voegelin, From Enlightenment to Revolution (Durham, N.C.: Duke 
University Press, 1975), ed. John H. Hollowell, p. 220. Paul H. Grumann's review of 
Ground Arms in the Quarterly also enumerates possible advantages of war. Grumann 
later got into trouble over expressing allegedly pro-German sentiments and was 
defended by H. B. Alexander (see Manley, University of Nebraska, pp. 213, 217, 220, 
221). 
15. Randolph S. Paul, "Made in Germany," attacks Preparedness and minimizes 
the danger of a German attack. This is the only other piece in the Quarterly that 
might by some stretch be considered pacifistic. 
16. See Carol S. Gruber, Mars and Minerva (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Uni-
versity Press, 1975), for a general account of political attitudes at the universities 
around World War 1. For the situation at Nebraska, see Manley, University of Ne-
braska, chap. 19 passim. For a dramatic illustration of how high the feelings ran in 
the faculty, see the minutes, for 9 April 1918, of Professor F. S. Sanford, secretary 
of the Patriotic League of the University of Nebraska. There he recounts a serious 
argument between himself and others and C. E. Persinger, who is accused of having 
a "soft" attitude toward the war and of feeling that patriotism merely masked a 
fundamental intolerance of Germany (University of Nebraska Archives, Board of 
Regents Papers, box 27, folder 200). Many members of the university's Patriotic 
Notes / 47 
League also contributed to the Quarterly: Alexander, Guernsey Jones, Le Rossignol, 
Persinger, Minnie Throop England. None of the Quarterly articles, however, either 
before or during the war, exhibits fanaticism. 
17. See May, End of American Innorence, pp. 354,370-75. 
CONCLUSION 
I. Irving Babbitt, "Genius and Taste," in Criticism in America: Its Function and 
Status (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1924), p. 171. 
2. See University Archives, "Alexander" in Avery Correspondence, 1908-1928. 
3. Paul A. Olson, "The Humanist in Nebraska," Nebraska Humanist 1, no. I 
(1978): 4. 
4. George Santayana, The Genteel Tradition at Bay (New York: Charles Scribner's 
Sons, 1931), pp. 17-18. He first advanced this view in 1913 in Winds of Doctrine. 
5. Ibid., p. 41. 
6. Irving Babbitt, On Being Creative (1932; reprint ed., New York: Biblo and 
Tannen, 1968), p. xxii. 
7. See T. S. Eliot, "The Humanism of Irving Babbitt," and "Second Thoughts 
about Humanism," in Selected Essays (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1950), 
pp. 419, 429. For a good, recent defense of Babbitt, see Claes G. Ryn, "The 
Humanism of Irving Babbitt Revisited," Modem Age 21 (1977): 251-62. 
8. See M. H. Abrams, Natural Supernaturalism: Tradition and Revolution in Roman-
tir Literature (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1971). This is the most sophisti-
cated recent study of English romanticism and its German affiliations. Abrams's 
thesis, in direct contrast to that of Frye, is that the romantics wished to defend 
"traditional concepts, schemes, and values" (p. 13); the neohumanists' view of the 
romantics he dismisses briefly as a "caricature" (p. 447). A knowledge of Abram's 
book is essential to anyone who aims at an honest and thoughtful appraisal of 
romanticism. His title (an apt one) would have seemed oxymoronic to Frye, and 
certainly a denial of his fundamental principle of dualism. But actually the 
neohumanists would have found much to agree with in this study; for after all, they 
alleged, and Abrams graphically shows, that the romantics tried to overturn the 
usual distinctions between supernatural and natural. It is just that Frye denounces 
what Abrams prefers to admire, or at least to defend as a healthy response to 
rationalism. 
9. On the democratic implications of Northrop Frye's criticism, see Geoffrey H. 
Hartman, "Ghostlier Demarcations," in Northrop Frye in Modem Criticism, ed. Murray 
Krieger (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966). See also Northrop Frye, 
"The Critical Path: An Essay on the Social Context of Literary Criticism," in Issues in 
Contemporary Literary Criticism, ed. Gregory T. Polletta (Boston: Little, Brown and 
Co., 1973), pp. 50-57. 
10. T. S. Eliot, The Four Quartets: East Coker. 
Index to the Mid-West Quarterly 
The Mid-West Quarterly was published by G. P. Putnam's Sons (Knickerbocker 
Press) from October 1913 to July 1918 (through the last few issues were delayed by 
editorial complications and the war). It is arranged in five volumes of four numbers 
each (October, January, April, July), continuously paginated; individual issues aver-
age slightly less than one hundred pages. All the items, unless otherwise described in 
brackets, are expository essays. They are identified first by volume number, fol-
lowed by issue, date, and pages. 
Alexander, Hartley Burr. "Asia" [poeml. 4, 3 (April 1917): 271. 
--. "'Enemy Language.''' 5,2 Oanuary 1918): 95-109. 
--. "Harry Kirke Wolfe" [obituaryl. 5, 4 Ouly 1918): 353. 
---. "'Laokoon' and the Prior Question." 1,4 Ouly 1914): 336-57. 
--. "Medea in Attica" [poem]. 4. 3 (April 1917): 270. 
---. "Music and Poetry." 3, 2 Oanuary 1916): 134-47. 
--. "The Philosophy of Tragedy." 4, 1 (October 1916): 1-15. 
---. "Screenings: Tagore and the New Orient." 4, 2 Oanuary 1917): 172-76. 
---. "The Socratic Bergson." I, I (October 1913): 32-43. 
Allen, Charles Sumner. "Some Legal Aspects of the Invasion of Belgium." 2, 3 
(April 1915): 280-88. 
---. "The Over-Social Function of the State University." 4, 1 (October 1916): 
16-33. 
---. "The Problem of Controversies." I, I (October 1913): 25-3\. 
---. "The Rationalization of Methods of Controversy." 5, 4 Ouly 1918): 332-52. 
Allin, Cephas D. "Joseph Chamberlain, the Radical." 2, 2 Oanuary 1915): 95-121. 
--. "Colonial Aspects of the War." 2, 3 (April 1915): 230--49. 
Andrews, E. Benjamin. "Art and Character." 3, 3 (April 1916): 238--50. 
---. "Greek Nationalism and Home Rule in the Fourth Century, B. c." 1,4 Ouly 
1914): 302-14. 
---. "Milton's Ecclesiastico-Political Setting." 3, 1 (October 1915): 59-68. 
---. "The Renaissance." 2, 2 Oanuary 1915): 136-55. 
Avery, Samuel. "Professional Advancement." 4, 2 Oanuary 1917): 119-22. 
Baker, Harry T. "The Qualities of Browning." 2, I (October 1914): 57-73. 
Belden, H. M. "A Study in Contemporary Balladry." 1,2 Oanuary 1914): 162-72. 
Bentley, Madison. "Settlement and Culture." 3, 2 Oanuary 1916): 98--107. 
Beyer, Thomas Percival. "Killing Time." 5, 4 Ouly 1918): 296-303. 
Buck, Philo M., Jr. "Americanism." 3, 3 (April 1916): 251-62. 
--. "Curbs" [dialogue]. 4, 3 (April 1917): 196-203. 
---. "Literature and the New Anti-intellectualism." 2,1 (October 1914): 74-94. 
---. "Magnacum Confusione" [dialoguel. 1, I (October 1913): 83-96. 
49 
SO/Index to the Mid-West Quarterly 
--. "A New Dialogue of the Dead" [dialoguel. 3, I (October 1915): 74-82. 
--. "Puero Reverentia" [dialoguel. 1,2 (January 1914): 173-86. 
--. "Screenings [no. 1]." 4, 3 (April 1917): 274-84. 
--. "Screenings [no. 2l." 4,4 (July 1917): 371-82. 
Buck, Robert W. "Bjornson as a Playwright." 3, 3 (April 1916): 216-23. 
Chung, Henry. "The Asiatic Monroe Doctrine." 5,2 (January 1918): 110-18. 
Colby, Elbridge. "Thomas Holcroft, Radical." 5, I (October 1917): 44-60. 
Coleman, A. 1. du P. "Bonneval Pasha." 1,4 (July 1914): 324-35. 
Cox, Edward Godfrey. "The Basis of Nationality." 5, 4 (July 1918): 312-31. 
Craig, Hardin. "The Mantle of Browning." 2, 2 (January, 1915): 162-68. 
Davis, Ellery W. "Cantor's Leap into the Transfinite." 4, 3 (April 1917): 239-50. 
--. "Charles Peirce at Johns Hopkins." 2, I (October 1914): 48-56. 
--. "Star Twinkling." 4, 4 (July 1917): 346-53. 
Dodge, Daniel Kilham. "Lincoln and Hamlet." 1,3 (April 1914): 220-22. 
Emsley, Bert. "Freshman English and Creative Teachers." 5, 4 (July 1918): 304-11. 
--. "The Poetry of William Vaughn Moody." 4, 3 (April 1917): 223-38. 
England, Minnie Throop. "The Chinese Colonies." 4, I (October 1916): 42-62. 
--. "Race Contact and Mixture in Colonies." 5, 3 (April 1918): 163-81. 
F. M. F. "Screenings: Tagore." 4, 2 (January 1917): 170-72. 
Fossler, Laurence. "Nietzsche Once More." 4, 3 (April 1917): 251-64. 
Frye, P. H. "German Romanticism." 1,2 (January 1914): 97-119. 
---. "Literature and Criticism." 1,3 (April 1914): 187-97. 
---. "Nietzsche." 2, 4 (July 1915): 312-42. 
---. "Plato's Political Ideas." 2, I (October 1914): 1-17. 
--. "Screenings." 3, 3 (April 1916): 224-29. 
--. "The Terms 'Classic' and 'Romantic.'" I, I (October 1913): 1-24. 
Gass, S. B. 'The Comedy of the Arts College." 1,3 (April 1914): 268-78. 
---. "The Ideal of Peace." 2, 3 (April 1915): 289-95. 
--. "The Intrusions of Science." I, I (October 1913): 57-72. 
--. "A Liberal Experience" [dialogue]. 5, 3 (April 1918): 227-57. 
--. "Literature as a Fine Art." 1,4 (July 1914): 279-93. 
---. "A Modern Paradox" [dialogue]. 3,4 (July 1916): 339-72. 
--. "Tolstoi and the Doctrine of Peace." 3, I (October 1915): 1-16. 
Gould, George M. "Jean Fran~ois Millet." 2, I (October 1914): 18-25. 
Grabo, Carl H. "Robert Bage: A Forgotten Novelist," 5, 3 (April 1918): 202-26. 
Grumann, Paul H. "Ground Arms" [book reviewl. 2,4 (July 1915): 390-96. 
Guthrie, Edwin Ray. "Formal Logic and Logical Form." I, 2 (January 1914): 
146-55. 
--. "Old Solutions of a New Problem." I, 3 (April 1914): 236-41. 
Hackney, Jr., W. W. "The Anglo-French Loan." 3, 2 (January 1916): 148-53. 
Hainer, E. J. "A Study in Immigration." 4, 4 (July 1917): 304-16. 
Hall, Philip Louis. "The Federal Banking Act." 3, 2 (January 1916): 108-12. 
---. "The Year in American Finance." 4, 3 (April 1917): 265-68. 
Hastings, William Granger. "Justice." 4, 2 (January 1917): 157-69. 
--. "Legislation by the Courts." 1,2 (January 1914): 132-45. 
Hinman, Edgar L. "Professorial Ethics." 1,4 (July 1914): 294-301. 
Johnson, Alvin S. "In Defense of the Professor who Publishes." 2, 4 (July 1915): 
343-56. 
Johnston, Robert. "The Mystery of Pain." 1,2 (January 1914): 156-61. 
Jones, Chester Lloyd. "Are State Legislatures Hopeless?" 5, 2 (January 1918): 
126-30. 
Index to the Mid-West Quarterly / 51 
--. "The Purchase of the Danish West Indies." 4, 3 (April 1917): 185-95. 
jones, Guernsey. "The Revolution in Portugal." 1,3 (April 1914): 251-67. 
--. "Why Copley Left Boston." 5, 2 (January 1918): 137-48. 
jones, Howard M. "A Mississippi Holiday" [autobiographical narrative]' 3, I (Oc-
tober 1915): 45-58. 
Kallen, Horace M. "A Pragmatic Interpretation of the History of Philosophy." 4, I 
(October 1916): 75-88. 
--. The Public School and the Painter." 3, I (October 1915): 17-26. 
--. "Socrates and the Street Car" [dialogue]. 1,4 (July 1914): 358-74. 
Kugelman, F. B. "Shaw and Religion." 5,3 (April 1918): 182-91. 
Kuhlman, Charles. "David Starr jordan-Eugenics and War." 4, 4 (July 1917): 
285-303. 
---. "Pacifism as an Offspring of the French Revolution." 2, 4 (July 1915): 
397-414. 
--. 'The Prince of Peace." 3, 4 (July 1916): 286--302. 
Le Rossignol,]. E. "Canada and the War." 2, 3 (April 1915): 264-79. 
---. "Canada in the World War." 5, 2 (January 1918): 149-62. 
Love, D. L. "War and Socialism." 3,4 (July 1916): 330--38. 
Lynn, Margaret. "Our Literary Limitations." 4,2 (January 1917): 146--56. 
Mackay, Constance D'Arcy. "The Trend of the Theatre." 5, I (October 1917): 
37-43. 
MacMinn, G. R. "Criticism and the Comic Spirit." 3, 2 (January 1916): 83-97. 
--. "Maeterlinck and the Romantic Compromise." 3, 4 (July 1916): 263-85. 
Maxey, Edwin. "The Russian Merchant Marine." 1,3 (April 1914): 209-19. 
Mifflin, Lloyd. "On the Headland" [poem]. 2,4 (July 1915): 311. 
Miles, Dudley. "The Sentimental Movement" [book review]. 4, 4 (July 1917): 
354-60. 
Miller,]. E. "The English in Egypt." 4,4 (July 1917): 317-33. 
Morris, George D. "American Traits as Seen by the French." 2, 2 (January 1915): 
169-83. 
Noble, William F. "A Student's View of the Ford Expedition" [travel journal]. 3, 4 
(July 1916): 303-29. 
Padelford, Frederick Morgan. "The Women in Spenser's Allegory of Love." 4, 2 
(January 1917): 134-45. 
Paul, Randolph S. "Made in Germany." 4, I (October 1916): 34-41. 
Peck, H. W. "The Criticism of Poetry." 5, 2 (January 1918): 131-36. 
Persinger, C. E. "The Unification of South America." 3, 2 (January 1916): 126--33. 
Phelps, Ruth Shepard. "Giosue Carducci." 2, 2 (January 1915): 122-35. 
---. "Young English Poets. 3, 2 (January 1916): 113-25. 
Philbrick, Francis T. "Rational Bases for Ultimate International Peace." 5, I (Oc-
tober 1917): 61-93. 
Pilsbury, L. B., M. D. "Some Aspects of Abnormal Psychology." 4, I (October 1916): 
63--74. 
Porterfield, Allen Wilson. "A Plea for the Poet of Lyric Music." 3, 3 (April 1916) 
201-15. 
Pound, Louise. "Ballads and the Illiterate." 5, 4 (July 1918): 274-95. 
--_. "Emerson as a Romanticist." 2, 2 (January 1915): 184-96. 
---. "The Literary Interregnum." I, I (October 1913): 73-82. 
---. "New-World Analogues of the English and Scottish Popular Ballads." 3, 3 
(April 1916): 171-87. 
Pound, Roscoe. "justice According to Law." 1,3 (April 1914): 223-35. 
52 / Index to the Mid-West Quarterly 
Quigley, Harold S. "The Congressional'Gerrymander in Missouri." 4, 2 (january 
1917): 107-18. 
Scheltema, J. F. "The Cradle of Christian France." 5, 3 (April 1918): 192-20l. 
Schmitt, Bernadotte E. "The Diplomatic Background of the European War." 2, 3 
(April 1915): 197-229. 
Schneider, Albert. "Panspermia." 5, 1 (October 1917): 26-36. 
Schrag, A. D. "German Versus English Aggression." 2, 3 (April 1915): 250--63. 
Searles, Colbert. "The Fundamental Element in Modern French Literature." 3, 
(October 1915): 27-44. 
Sears, Louis Martin. "French Opinion of our Civil War." 2, 4 (july 1915): 357-66. 
Shafer, Robert. "Poetry and Archaeology." 1,4 (july 1914): 315-23. 
Sheffield, Alfred. "College Study of English." 1,3 (April 1914): 198-208. 
Smith, Lewis Worthington. "Movie Democracy." 4, 4 (july 1917): 334-45. 
Spencer, Arthur W. "Sociology and the Law." 2, 2 (January 1915): 156-6l. 
---. "Some Aspects of Literary Production." 3, 1 (October 1915): 69-73. 
Stanton, Theodore. "French War Poetry." 5, 2 (january 1918): 119-25. 
Stedman, Laura. "Bayard Taylor." 3, 3 (April 1916): 230--37. 
Stratton, Clarence. "A Shakespeare Festival at Stratford-on-Avon." 4, 2 (january 
1917): 123-33. 
Swezey, G. D. "Theories of Cosmic Evolution." 2,1 (October 1914): 31-47. 
Taylor, W. G. Langworthy. "American High Prices and European Loans." 4, 2 
(January 1917): 89-106. 
---. "The Man from the Moon, an American Citizen, a Bull-mooser, and a 
Suffragette" [dialogue]. 3, 2 (January 1916): 154-70. 
--. "The Man from the Moon, A Jeffersonian, and a Socialist" [dialoguel. 2, 3 
(April 1915): 296-310. 
--. "Spiritualism, Pacifism, Socialism: An Inquiry into the Nature of 'Isms.' "5, 
1 (October 1917): 1-14 
Thompson, Elbert N. S. "Toleration in Puritan England." 4, 3 (April 1917) : 204-22. 
Throop, George R. "A Classical Romanticist." 2, 4 (July 1915): 367-89. 
Thurber, Edward A. "The Modern Ideal of Culture." 1,3 (April 1914): 242-50. 
Trimble, Chandler. "The East of the World" [a poeml. 4, 3 (April 1917): 273. 
--. "Individualism and Government." 3, 3 (April 1916): 188-200. 
--. "Whither the Tempest" [poem]. 4, 3 (April 1917): 272. 
Warshaw, J. "The Aesthetic Fallacy in Literary Appreciation." 4, 4 (July 1917): 
361-70. 
Watkins, Albert. "The Oregon Recruit Expedition." 1, 1 (October 1913): 44-56. 
Webster, Hutton. "Newman on the Development of Christian Doctrine." 5, 1 (Oc-
tober 1917): 15-25. 
--. "Savage Spiritualism." 1, 2 (January 1914): 120--3l. 
Whipple, T. K. "Lionel Johnson." 2, 1 (October 1914): 26-30. 
Wolfe, H. K. "Personality and Education." 5, 4 (July 1918): 259-73. 
Abrams, M. H., 47 
Addison, Joseph, 20 
Alexander, H. B., viii, xi, 6, 13--16, 
18, 24, 25, 26, 28, 29, 30, 38-40, 
41,44,45,46,47 
Allen, Charles Sumner, 46 
Allin, Cephas D., 33--34 
Andrews, E. Benjamin, 24-25, 44 
Aristophanes, 20, 22 
Arnold, Matthew, ix, x, xii, xiii, 5, 
17,19,27,28,40,45 
Augustine, 13 
Avery, Samuel, xi, xii, 38 
Babbitt, Irving, vii, viii, x, xi, 6, 8, 
14, 17, 18,25,31,40,41,45,47 
Bacon, Francis, 2 
Benda, Julien, 45 
Bergson, H., ix, x, 10, 13, 14, 16, 
19,45 
Buck, P. M., Jr., viii, xi, xii, 10-13, 
14, 15,20,26,29,35-36,37,38, 
44 
Burke, Edmund, 11,31,32,45,46 
Capitalism, 20-22 
Carlyle, Thomas, 27 




Conservatism, ix, x, 12, 19,22,31, 
37,40,41 
Craig, Hardin, viii, 27 
Criticism, 3--4, 7, 26--28 
Dakin, A. H., 42 
Democracy, 4, 9, 12, 15, 16,25,26, 
36 
Descartes, R., 13, 16 
Dewey, John, 37 
Dickens, Charles, 29 
Dualism, 3, 5, 47 
Duggan, F. x., 42 
Edison, T. A., ix 
Index 
Education, x, 8-9,11-13,15,28-31 
Eliot, T. S., 40, 41, 47 
Emerson, R. W., 3, 5, 17, 18,28 
Emsley, Bert 27-28,30-31 
Engerman, S. L., 46 
England, Minnie Throop, 32, 47 
Fairchild, H. N., 14 
Fielding, Henry, 29 
Foerster, Norman, 42 
Fogel, R. W., 46 
Forbes, C. A., 42 
Forward, Kenneth, 42, 44 
Foster, Stephen, 18 
Frost, Robert, II 
Frye, Northrop, 42,47 
Frye, Prosser Hall, vii-xiii passim, 
1-6, 7-18 passim, 24, 25, 26, 
38-42 passim, 45, 47 
Gass, S. B., viii, xi, 6--10, 11-15 pas-
sim, 20, 25, 26, 29, 34-35, 37, 38, 
43, 44, 46 
Goethe, J. W. von, 41 
Gruber, Carol S., 46 
Grumann, Paul H., 46 
Hastings, William Granger, 31 
Hinduism, 3, 4, 5 
Hinman, Edgar L., 46 
Hoeveler, J. David, Jr., 42 
Homer, 17 
Hubbard, Elbert, 16 
Hugo, Victor, 2 
Humanism, x, 12, 14-15, 16,18,19, 
24, 25, 29, 30, 39, 40, 41 
Johnson, Alvin S., 46 
Johnson, Samuel, 16, 27,44,45 
Jones, Guernsey, 47 
Justice, 31-32 
Kallen, Horace M., 28, 29, 45 
Kant, E., 13, 16 
Kugelman, F. B., 27 
Kuhlman, Charles, 36, 37 
54 / Index 
Le Rossignol, J. E., 46, 47 
Lewis, C. S., 41, 44 
Longfellow, W. W., 27 
Lowell, J. R., 27 
Lynn, Margaret, 27 
MacMinn, G. R., 45 
Manley, Robert N., 44, 45, 46 
Masefield, J., 29 
May, Henry F., ix, x, xi, 40, 47 
Mencken, H. L., viii 
Miller, J. E., 32 
Moody, W. V., 27, 30 
Morality, ix, 2-13 passim, 25, 29, 
36, 38 
More, Louis Trenchard, vii 
More, Paul Elmer, vii, viii, x, xi, 6, 
25,31,40 
Muggeridge, Malcolm, 41 
Nation, vii, xii, 1 
Naturalism, ix, 2-12 passim, 15, 27, 
42 
Neohumanism, vii-xiii passim, 1, 
4-19 passim, 25, 26, 28, 30, 31, 
37,40,41,42,47 
Newman, J. H., 26 
New Republic, vii 
Niebuhr, Reinhold, 41 
Nietzsche, Friedrich, 1,4,5,27 
Ortega y Gasset, Jose, 44 
Pacifism, xiii, 19, 34-37 
Panichas, G. A., 42 
Paul, Randolph, 46 
Persinger, C. E., 46, 47 
Philbrick, Francis T., 36 
Plato, 1,4,5,8, 12, 13,25 
Pound, Louise, viii, 16-19, 27, 45 
Pound, Olivia, xii 
Pound, Roscoe, 31-32 
Prairie Schooner, viii 
Romanticism, ix, 1-10 passim, 
14-15,20,26,27,41,47 
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, 2 
Ryn, Claes G., 47 
Sanford, F. S., 46 
Santayana, George, 40, 41, 42 
Schmitt, Bernadotte E., 33, 34 
Schrag, A. D., 34 
Shafer, Robert, viii, 27 
Shakespeare, William, 2, 5, 6, 17 
Shaw, B., 27 
Sheffield, Alfred D., 29 
Smith, Lewis W., 26-27 
Socialism, 4, 19, 20-22 
Socrates, 13, 16, 22 
Sophocles, 2 
Stock, R. D., 44, 45 
Taylor, W. G. Langworthy, viii, 
19-23, 38, 46 
Thurber, Edward A., 45 
Tolstoy, L., 2 
Trilling, L., 44 
Twain, Mark, 27 
University Journal, xii, 43 
Voegelin, Eric, 41, 46 
War, ix, xiii, 33-37 
Warshaw, J., 46 
Webster, Hutton, 26 
Wells, H. G., 29 
Whipple, T. K., 27 
Whitman, Walt, 11, 17, 18,27,28 
Williams, Duncan, 44 
Wilson, Woodrow, ix, 19 
Wimberly, Lowry, viii 
Wolfe, H. K., 29-30, 38 
Zola, E., ix, 2 
